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SanityOps Framework Relevance ​


Version: v1.1

Release Date: October 2026

Maintained by: Sanity AI Labs

License: CC BY-SA 4.0

Depends on Specification: Core v1.1 (unified numbering, association types, causal boundaries)


Table of Contents ​


Document Information ​

ItemContent
Document NameSanityOps Inspect Defect Impact and Linkage Mapping Specification
Versionv1.1
StatusReleased
DateOctober 2026
Applicable FrameworkSanityOps Inspect, Risk, Quality Subsets
Maintained bySanity AI Labs

Preface ​

0.1 Purpose ​

SanityOps Inspect identifies quality defects in Prompts, Skills, Tool Schemas, and cross-artifact relationships; Risk audits explicit risks or validates implicit, dynamic attack risks; Quality evaluates actual Agent service quality.

Core questions differ for the three activity types:

SubsetCore QuestionTypical Output
InspectDo artifact definitions or relationships have defects?QD defects, severity levels, static evidence, remediation recommendations
Risk ExplicitDo artifacts contain explicit dangerous instructions or configurations?EX classification, D1/D2/D3, Explicit·P0/P1/P2 grades
Risk ImplicitCan risk behaviors be triggered through attack paths in controlled environments?Dynamic attack results, exploitation evidence, handling recommendations
Quality Tool-AgentDoes Tool Agent stably complete target tasks?Success/failure, reliability, quality Gate
Quality RAG-AgentAre RAG Agent content outputs and boundary responses qualified?12 quality metrics, critical test case Gate, regression conclusions

This specification establishes formal mapping models between Inspect defects and other subsets, enabling Inspect outputs to further answer:

  1. Which security attack surfaces this defect may expand;
  2. Which Risk Explicit or Risk Implicit validations should be prioritized;
  3. Which Tool-Agent or RAG-Agent quality failures this defect may associate with;
  4. Which Inspect defects should be prioritized when Quality discovers failures;
  5. What evidence needs to be retained after remediation, and what re-inspection and regression to execute.

0.2 Scope ​

0.2.1 In Scope ​

This specification applies to the following static logic artifacts and their relationships:

  • System prompts, role prompts, workflow prompts, and examples;
  • Agent Skill name, description, trigger conditions, inputs and outputs, failure strategies, and permission declarations;
  • Tool Schema name, description, inputSchema, parameter constraints, side effects, and changes;
  • Consistency relationships between Prompt–Skill, Prompt–Tool, and Skill–Tool;
  • Linkage relationships among the above artifacts in security validation, quality supplementary testing, and release governance.

0.2.2 Out of Scope ​

This specification does not:

  • Add, delete, or modify existing Inspect rules or their QD numbers;
  • Directly determine static defects as already exploited vulnerabilities;
  • Replace Risk Implicit shadow sandbox attack validation;
  • Replace Quality's final determination of actual output, task success, or release quality;
  • Replace IAM, network isolation, backend parameter validation, approval systems, runtime monitoring, or compliance controls;
  • Perform complete root cause attribution for retrieval, re-ranking, Embedding, model weights, databases, networks, or infrastructure.

0.3 Normative References and Version Applicability ​

This specification establishes mapping relationships based on the following SanityOps documents:

Source Sub-specificationAdopted VersionUsage in This Specification
Inspect Promptv1.1Uses QD-P numbering, definitions, and Inspect·P0/P1/P2 rules
Inspect Skillv1.1Uses QD-S numbering, Review Schema, and risk classification rules
Inspect Toolv1.1Uses QD-T numbering, Schema constraints, and high-risk operation definitions
Inspect Crossv1.1Uses QD-PS, QD-PT, QD-ST, QD-SS, QD-TT, QD-CYC numbering and consistency relationships
Inspect Permissionv1.1Uses QD-PM numbering and permission baseline domain determinations (QD-PM-1~6)
Risk Explicitv1.1Uses EX, D1/D2/D3, Explicit·P0/P1/P2 risk model
Risk Implicitv1.1Uses shadow sandbox, dynamic attack, and continuous validation principles
Quality Tool-Agentv1.1Uses task success/failure, reliability, and risk-driven testing principles
Quality RAG-Agentv1.1Uses four-dimensional 12 metrics, critical test cases, and regression Gate principles

0.3.1 Source Specification Priority Principle ​

If there is a conflict between this specification and a source sub-specification regarding rule numbering, definitions, severity levels, or release requirements, the corresponding source sub-specification shall take precedence.

The mapping strength, attack surfaces, candidate failure modes, validation recommendations, and diagnostic recommendations in this specification do not alter the original determinations of the source sub-specifications.


0.4 Core Principles ​

  1. Correlation is not causation A QD defect indicates missing, ambiguous, inconsistent, or insufficiently bounded definitions; it does not automatically prove that an attack has succeeded, a runtime vulnerability exists, or a quality failure has occurred.

  2. Static checks do not replace dynamic validation Whether a defect is exploitable, can be bypassed, or is blocked by external compensating controls should be validated by Risk Implicit in a controlled environment.

  3. Actual output takes precedence over static inference Tool-Agent reliability, RAG-Agent quality metrics, and release conclusions must be based on actual Quality test results.

  4. Least privilege and least impact When inconsistencies exist across multiple artifacts in permissions, constraints, resources, or failure strategies, convergence should prioritize narrower permissions, stricter constraints, and more conservative failure strategies.

  5. Single defects and defect chains are both important A single defect can constitute a risk condition; when multiple defects across Prompt, Skill, and Tool compound, they may form a higher-risk linked defect chain.

  6. Evidence first, manual confirmation Automated mapping is used for discovery and prioritization. Conclusions involving root cause, exploitability, risk acceptance, or release exceptions must retain evidence and undergo appropriate manual confirmation.

  7. Mapping library is versionable Mapping rules, applicability conditions, test templates, confidence levels, and manual confirmation results should be versioned together with artifacts, rule libraries, and test assets.


0.5 Terms and Abbreviations ​

TermDefinition
Impact MappingRules that associate QD defects with potential attack surfaces, validation strategies, quality failure modes, and regression requirements.
Attack SurfaceBehavioral entry points that may be exploited by malicious input, untrusted context, error states, or abnormal data.
Defect ChainA candidate risk path formed by two or more interrelated defects.
Mapping StrengthThe degree of association between a defect and a specific security or quality impact; not equivalent to severity level.
Candidate Root CauseA prioritized investigation direction derived from quality failures or dynamic validation results; not a final root cause conclusion.
Compensating ControlControls external to the artifact, such as backend validation, IAM, gateways, approval, audit, or isolation mechanisms.
Static EvidenceArtifact originals, Schemas, version hashes, rule hit locations, etc.
Dynamic EvidenceShadow sandbox attack results, call trajectories, parameter records, logs, and runtime outputs.
Quality EvidenceBaseline test cases, Agent outputs, rule validations, Judge conclusions, metrics, and Gate results.

Abbreviations ​

AbbreviationFull Form
QDStatic logic artifact defect (a static defect defined by Inspect rules; not equivalent to a quality failure)
EXExplicit Risk
D1Confidentiality Impact Type Label
D2Integrity Impact Type Label
D3Authorization Impact Type Label
Explicit·P0/P1/P2Risk Explicit Severity Grades
FMFailure Mode
ASAttack Surface
GateRelease or Handling Gate
RAGRetrieval-Augmented Generation

Chapter 1: Unified Impact Mapping Model ​

1.1 Mapping Objectives ​

Each Inspect defect can be mapped to four types of information:

QD Static Defect
   ↓
Potential Attack Surface / Candidate Behavior Failure Modes
   ↓
Risk Validation Recommendations / Quality Supplementary Test Recommendations
   ↓
Dynamic Evidence, Quality Results, Remediation and Regression Status

Mapping output objectives are not to replace any existing conclusions, but to provide actionable priority recommendations for subsequent activities.

1.2 Four-Section Relationship Structure ​

A standard mapping relationship should have at least the following structure:

LevelContentExample
Defect LayerDiscovered QD defectQD-T-3.2 Untrusted Input Entering an Executable Context
Impact LayerAttack surface or candidate failure modeParameter injection, parameter errors, downstream call failures
Validation LayerRisk or Quality recommended activitiesInjection testing, boundary parameter testing, abnormal input regression
Evidence LayerEvidence supporting or refuting associationsSchema, call trajectories, shadow sandbox results, quality test case results

1.3 Mapping Strength ​

Mapping strength reflects "whether validation or supplementary testing should be prioritized", not vulnerability severity, nor does it replace Inspect·P0/P1/P2 or Explicit·P0/P1/P2.

StrengthMeaningPlatform Behavior
StrongDefect directly expands attack entry, or highly likely to cause specified failure modeAutomatically recommend related Risk or Quality test cases
MediumMay have impact under specific permission, data, Tool, or process conditionsRecommend based on applicability conditions
ConditionalRequires external knowledge bases, runtime environments, model behaviors, or business rulesAs candidate investigation direction, no automatic conclusion
Not ApplicableCurrent Agent type, artifact type, or runtime conditions lack association prerequisitesDo not output this recommendation

1.4 Single Defect Mapping ​

Single defect mapping is used to identify the risk a single defect may pose under normal conditions.

Defect ExampleCandidate ImpactRecommended Action
QD-P-2.5.2 Missing Security Boundary ConstraintsInstruction boundary confusion, unauthorized response, sensitive information outputInjection, system prompt extraction, unauthorized request validation
QD-S-4.1 Failure Behavior UndefinedExpanded search after failure, lowered restrictions, uncontrolled error recoveryTool failure, permission denial, insufficient data testing
QD-TT-5.2 Multi-Tool Semantic CompetitionWrong Tool selection, incorrect side effects, duplicate callsSimilar Tool, fuzzy intent, near-synonym expression testing
QD-PT-2.3 Parameter Constraint ConsistencyMismatch between Prompt parameter requirements and Tool SchemaEnd-to-end parameter construction, Schema validation, version regression

Single defect mapping should not ignore controls external to the artifact. For example, insufficient parameter constraints in a Tool Schema do not imply the backend lacks additional validation; whether it is exploitable should still be determined through dynamic validation.

1.5 Defect Chain Mapping ​

Defect chains are used to identify candidate exploitation or failure paths formed by multiple defects in combination.

1.5.1 Defect Chain Basic Patterns ​

text
Boundary deficiency
+ Insufficient permission declaration
+ Tool high-risk capability or data flow
= May form an unauthorized access or data exfiltration path

1.5.2 Typical Examples ​

text
QD-P-2.5.2 Missing Security Boundary Constraints
+ QD-S-5.1 Read/Write/Delete Permissions Not Distinguished
+ QD-T-3.2 Untrusted Input Entering an Executable Context
+ QD-TT-5.1 Cross-Tool Data Flow
= Injection → Unauthorized invocation → Sensitive data exfiltration candidate chain

When a defect chain is identified, the following actions should be taken:

  1. Mark it with a unique chain_id in the report;
  2. Retain the member defects and their cross-artifact relationships;
  3. Prioritize end-to-end Risk Implicit validation;
  4. Design coordinated remediation using least privilege, strictest constraints, and most conservative failure strategies;
  5. After remediation, perform regression on the complete path, not just re-inspection of individual QD items.

1.6 Conclusion Priority and Conflict Handling ​

Conclusions from different subsets cannot substitute for each other. When surface-level conflicts arise, they should be interpreted according to their respective problem domains.

SituationCorrect Interpretation
Inspect passes, but Risk Implicit attack succeedsStatic check did not find the corresponding defect, or the attack depends on runtime conditions; the security validation result is valid and should be prioritized.
Inspect hits Inspect·P0, but Risk cannot reproduce the attackThe defect still needs to be handled per Inspect rules; failure to reproduce does not mean the defect does not exist.
Risk Explicit finds no EX risk, but Inspect hits boundary deficiencyAbsence of dangerous expression does not mean boundaries are intact; retain the QD defect and recommend dynamic validation.
Quality passes, but Inspect has Inspect·P0Quality testing cannot waive static Inspect·P0; handle per the source specification's Inspect Gate.
Inspect passes, but Quality failsThe quality failure is valid; diagnose from knowledge, model, configuration, runtime environment, and artifact defects.
Quality fails, but no QD is foundMust not forcibly attribute to artifact defects; record as "unconfirmed root cause".

Chapter 2: Security Impact Mapping Model ​

2.1 Security Impact Dimensions ​

This specification adopts five types of potential security consequences. Among them, D1, D2, D3 correspond to Risk Explicit impact type labels, but specific grading still follows Risk Explicit v1.1 independently. Grading is determined by Explicit·P0/P1/P2.

Security ConsequenceCorresponding DimensionTypical Consequences
Confidentiality RiskD1Sensitive data leakage, Prompt leakage, unauthorized reading, external data sending
Integrity RiskD2Erroneous writing, deletion, payment, configuration modification, business rule bypass
Authorization RiskD3Privilege escalation, identity confusion, cross-tenant access, unauthorized delegation
Availability RiskExtended dimensionInfinite retries, call storms, resource exhaustion, timeouts and service degradation
Audit and Traceability RiskExtended dimensionUnknown call sources, unclear data flows, inability to correlate evidence or responsible parties

D1/D2/D3 are the impact type labels of Risk Explicit; this specification only records their potential association directions and does not automatically produce D labels. Grading is determined by Explicit·P0/P1/P2.

2.2 Attack Surface Classification ​

IDAttack SurfaceDefinition
AS-01Instruction and Context Boundary ConfusionMistaking untrusted input, documents, history content, or external returns as high-priority instructions.
AS-02Input and Parameter InjectionUnconstrained user or external input entering Tools, backends, or downstream interpreters.
AS-03Output Handling and Sensitive Data ExfiltrationSensitive information being output, concatenated, referenced, forwarded, or written to external destinations.
AS-04Permission, Identity, and Delegation ExpansionBroad capabilities, incorrect authorization, or chained calls leading to out-of-scope operations.
AS-05Tool Misuse and High-Risk Side EffectsWrong Tool selection, accidental write operations, batch operations, or unconfirmed irreversible actions.
AS-06Resource Exhaustion and Runaway ExecutionNo upper limits on input, output, calls, retries, or recursion leading to resource loss of control.
AS-07Anomaly Propagation and Cascading FailuresAfter Tool or dependency failure, Agent adopts undefined expansion, retry, or degradation strategies.
AS-08Configuration, Naming, and Supply Chain ConfusionSimilar Tool names, Schema changes, dangerous default values, or abnormal callback addresses leading to misuse.
AS-09Cross-Artifact Contract BreachInconsistencies in authorization, parameters, output, permissions, or error strategies across Prompt, Skill, and Tool.

2.3 Mapping Boundaries with Risk Explicit ​

Risk Explicit audits explicit dangerous instructions, dangerous configurations, or risk expressions already present in artifacts; Inspect audits the completeness, clarity, boundaries, and consistency defects of artifacts.

Therefore, the relationship between the two is as follows:

Inspect FindingCorrect Action for Risk Explicit
Security boundary missingStrengthen scanning of related artifacts; do not automatically determine an EX classification.
Permission control boundary missingPrioritize checking for explicit unauthorized declarations, dangerous permission fields, or bypass expressions.
Tool description quality insufficientCheck descriptions, default values, examples, and structural fields for instruction injection or dangerous configurations.
Cross permission inconsistencyPrioritize checking cross-object risk expressions, authorization chain forgery, and structural declaration contradictions.
Raw input passthroughCheck for explicit dangerous parameters, script fragments, or abnormal constraints; dynamic exploitability remains under Risk Implicit.

2.3.1 Prohibited Automatic Inference ​

The following inferences are all invalid:

text
QD-P-2.5.2 Security Boundary Missing
≠ Automatic hit NL-A-7 Reverse Restriction Elimination Type

QD-T-1.4 additionalProperties Not Controlled
≠ Automatic hit NR-S-3 Parameter Type/Constraint Abnormal Declaration

QD-PS-1.3 Permission Boundary Consistency Defect
≠ Automatic hit NL-B-9 Cross-Object Authorization Chain Forgery

Only when an explicit expression meeting the EX definition exists in the artifact can Risk Explicit independently determine the corresponding EX classification.

2.4 Mapping Relationship with Risk Implicit ​

Risk Implicit should use impact mapping as the test design input for dynamic validation.

Mapping FieldRisk Implicit Usage
Attack surfaceSelect attack strategies and input variants
Potential impactDefine criteria for attack success, interception, or failure
Applicability conditionsConfigure shadow sandbox, Mock data, identity, permissions, and external dependencies
Defect chainDesign end-to-end attack paths across Prompt, Skill, and Tool
Remediation recommendationsForm regression attack set after remediation

2.4.1 Dynamic Validation Result Feedback ​

Risk ResultSignificance for Impact Mapping
Attack successfulMapping gains dynamic empirical evidence; associated defect chain should be escalated in handling priority.
Intercepted by external controlArtifact-layer defects may still exist; mark as "depends on compensating controls."
Model rejected or not triggeredNot reproduced under current conditions; must not close static defect based on this.
Insufficient conditionsCannot determine; should supplement shadow sandbox, permissions, data, or call chain conditions.

2.5 High-Priority Security Mapping Rules ​

The complete security mapping uses Appendix A as the sole authoritative source (listing, rule by rule, the attack surface, impact, mapping strength, and validation recommendation for each QD rule). This section only explains how to derive the "high-priority" validation subset from Appendix A and does not maintain a second mapping table.

High priority is determined by the following rules:

  1. Rules with mapping strength strong: enter the Risk validation queue first.
  2. Inspect·P0 rules: regardless of mapping strength, must enter Risk Explicit review or Risk Implicit validation.
  3. Cross-artifact rules (QD-PS/QD-PT/QD-ST/QD-SS/QD-TT/QD-CYC/QD-PM): prioritize end-to-end validation per the defect chains in Appendix D.
  4. Explicit·P0 explicit risks: determined independently by Risk Explicit; outside the derivation scope of this appendix.

The platform must not maintain a second mapping table outside Appendix A. Among the derivation rules in this section, rule 1 acts on the "Mapping Strength" column of Appendix A; rule 2 relies on the severity level of the source sub-specification (Appendix A has no severity column); rule 3 depends on the defect chain definitions in Appendix D. None of the three duplicates the mapping content of Appendix A.

2.6 External Risk Classification Reference Principles ​

This specification may reference OWASP LLM / Agentic risk language to facilitate communication of threat directions, but shall not replace SanityOps numbering with external numbering.

SanityOps Attack SurfaceReference External Risk Directions
AS-01Prompt Injection, System Prompt Leakage
AS-02Improper Input Handling, Injection
AS-03Sensitive Information Disclosure, Improper Output Handling
AS-04Excessive Agency, Excessive Permissions
AS-05Tool Misuse, Unsafe Action Execution
AS-06Unbounded Consumption, Denial of Service
AS-07Insecure Error Handling, Failure Escalation
AS-08Supply Chain, Configuration Confusion
AS-09Agentic System Misconfiguration

External mapping is for threat modeling and communication purposes only and does not constitute a declaration of conformity with any external standard.

2.7 Security Defect Chains and Defense in Depth ​

2.7.1 Defense Layers ​

text
Prompt: Global rules, task boundaries, permissions, and failure strategies
   ↓
Skill: Capability boundaries, trigger conditions, resource and call limits
   ↓
Tool: Hard parameter constraints, side effects, internal fields, and data flows
   ↓
Backend and Runtime Environment: IAM, server-side validation, approval, audit, isolation

2.7.2 Handling Principles ​

When a defect chain spans multiple defense layers:

  • Do not only fix the most superficial Prompt wording;
  • Priority should be given to retaining non-bypassable hard constraints at the Tool and backend layers;
  • Skills should tighten capability, permission, resource, and failure strategies;
  • Prompts should fill in global boundaries, call specifications, and conflict arbitration;
  • Risk validation after remediation must cover the complete attack path;
  • If relying on compensating controls, the report should clearly state the control name, owner, validation evidence, and failure risk.

Chapter 3: Quality Impact Mapping Model ​

3.1 Basic Principles ​

The relationship between Inspect defects and Quality results is a diagnostic association, not an automatic causal relationship.

text
Inspect: Discovers potential problems at the artifact layer
      ↓
Quality: Observes actual Agent output or task results
      ↓
Impact Mapping: Provides candidate failure modes and priority investigation directions
      ↓
Human + Evidence: Confirm root cause, remediation, and regression

Quality failures may also be caused by issues in the knowledge base, retrieval, re-ranking, model version, context, runtime configuration, external services, or test assets. Therefore, Quality failures must not be used to directly assert that a particular QD is the sole root cause.

3.2 Tool-Agent Quality Impact Mapping ​

3.2.1 Quality Determination Boundaries ​

Quality Tool-Agent uses the final task result for binary determination:

  • Success: Final output meets expectations, task completed;
  • Failure: Final output does not meet expectations, task not completed, timeout, or interruption.

The overall reliability is:

$$ \text{Reliability} = \frac{\text{Number of Successful Executions}}{\text{Total Number of Executions}} \times 100% $$

Process information such as tool selection, call order, parameter generation, and output stitching serves as trajectory evidence for diagnosing failure causes and does not independently constitute a first-level quality score.

3.2.2 Universal Behavior Failure Modes ​

IDCandidate Failure ModeObservable Behavior
FM-01Input understanding or parsing failureRequest not recognized, field misinterpreted, incorrect extraction conditions
FM-02Skill false trigger or missed triggerInvoked when should not be, not invoked when should be
FM-03Tool misselectionCapability mismatch, incorrectly invoking high-risk Tool
FM-04Parameter generation errorMissing parameter, type error, format error, out of bounds
FM-05Call order or contract mismatchUpstream result not passed, downstream missing fields, incorrect order
FM-06Output not consumableMissing fields, invalid structure, unstable format
FM-07Incomplete content or task expansionOmitting required conditions, exceeding user goals, self-supplementing erroneous information
FM-08Exception recovery failureRunaway retries, erroneous degradation, task interruption, repeated side effects
FM-09Boundary action errorFailure to properly handle when clarification, refusal, confirmation, or handoff is required
FM-10Unstable execution or resource runawayInconsistent results for same input, looped calls, timeout, budget exhaustion

3.2.3 Main Mapping Relationships ​

Inspect Defect CategoryCandidate Failure ModesQuality Tool-Agent Supplementary Test Recommendations
Prompt role, responsibility, goal, or priority unclearFM-01, FM-02, FM-07Out-of-role tasks, multi-goal conflicts, rule priority conflicts
Prompt input source, format, or requiredness underdefinedFM-01, FM-04Empty input, missing fields, malformed input, conflicting fields
Prompt output format or Schema incompleteFM-06Downstream parsing, structured fields, format compliance testing
Prompt tool invocation specification missingFM-03, FM-04, FM-05Tool selection, parameter dependency, call order, abnormal returns
Prompt termination, frequency, or retry limits missingFM-08, FM-10Max call count, timeout, rate limiting, retry, and idempotency
Skill trigger, non-activation, or task scope unclearFM-02, FM-07, FM-09Adjacent intent, negative intent, mixed intent, out-of-bounds tasks
Skill default, ambiguity, or failure strategy missingFM-01, FM-07, FM-08Insufficient information, permission denied, insufficient data, partial completion
Skill permission, confirmation, or environment boundary unclearFM-05, FM-09Read/write/delete, production environment, high-risk confirmation, chain calls
Tool parameter constraint insufficientFM-04, FM-05, FM-08Type, length, format, numeric, array, and combined boundary tests
Tool description insufficient or Tool semantic competitionFM-03, FM-05Similar Tools, near-synonym expressions, ambiguous tasks, malicious guidance
Tool side effects, batch limits, or data flow risksFM-08, FM-09, FM-10Batch, cancel, rollback, confirmation, cross-Tool value passing
Cross parameter, output, permission, or failure strategy inconsistencyFM-04, FM-05, FM-06, FM-08End-to-end contract, call chain permissions, exception chain, version compatibility

3.3 RAG-Agent Quality Impact Mapping ​

3.3.1 Quality Determination Boundaries ​

Quality RAG-Agent evaluates user-visible content output and boundary handling, and does not directly score internal components such as Prompt, retrieval, knowledge base, model, or Tool.

Its four-dimensional 12 metrics are:

DimensionMetrics
Knowledge answer qualityCorrectness, Completeness, Relevance, Traceability, Timeliness
Dialogue and complex task qualityConsistency, Robustness, Decomposition Capability, Coherence
Expression and compliance qualityFormat compliance
Boundary and safety response qualityBoundary recognition capability, Safety response capability

The mapping relationship only indicates that a certain type of Inspect defect may affect the relevant quality metrics, making it worth prioritizing supplementary test design or investigation; it does not mean that the defect will necessarily cause a loss of points in that metric.

3.3.2 Main Mapping Relationships ​

Inspect Defect CategoryPotentially Affected RAG MetricsRecommended Supplementary Tests
Prompt logical contradiction, responsibility mismatch, unclear goalsCorrectness, Relevance, Consistency, Format complianceRule conflicts, role boundaries, multi-constraint issues
Prompt gray areas and undefined priority levelsConsistency, Robustness, Boundary recognition, Safety responseVague expressions, multi-turn probing, conflicting rules
Prompt input source, format, or ambiguity handling missingRelevance, Robustness, Decomposition capability, Boundary recognitionColloquial rewrites, missing conditions, multi-intent, abnormal formats
Prompt output structure, citation, or stability underdefinedCompleteness, Traceability, Format compliance, ConsistencyCitations, disclaimers, fields, JSON/Markdown format
Prompt resource, Tool, or data boundary insufficientCorrectness, Traceability, Timeliness, Safety responseKnowledge source selection, Tool failure, source conflicts, timely knowledge
Prompt insufficient examples or examples conflicting with rulesCorrectness, Consistency, Robustness, Format compliancePositive/negative examples, boundary expressions, adversarial rewrites
Skill trigger, non-activation, and task scope unclearRelevance, Decomposition capability, Boundary recognition, Safety responseAdjacent intents, out-of-scope questions, clarification-needed and handoff-needed questions
Skill failure, partial completion, and recovery strategy missingCompleteness, Coherence, Safety responseNo knowledge hit, retrieval failure, partial data, source conflicts
Tool parameter, description, side effect, or competition defectsCorrectness, Relevance, Traceability, Format complianceRetrieval/citation Tool selection, return parsing, source citation
Cross output, parameter, permission, or failure strategy inconsistencyCorrectness, Completeness, Consistency, Format compliance, Safety responseEnd-to-end citation, parameter passing, permission boundaries, error chains

3.3.3 Special Limitations ​

The following factors may cause RAG quality failures but are not within the current full coverage scope of Inspect mapping:

  • Authoritative knowledge itself being erroneous, missing, or outdated;
  • Anomalies in document chunking, indexing, retrieval recall, re-ranking, or citation chains;
  • Changes in model version, temperature, context window, or vendor behavior;
  • Errors in the evaluation test cases, Judge, or rule validators themselves;
  • Missing user identity, real-time business state, or external system state.

3.4 Quality Supplementary Test Design Rules ​

When impact mapping generates Quality supplementary tests, the following rules shall be followed:

  1. Select test cases by risk
    Inspect·P0, exploited defect chains, critical business scenarios, or high-risk boundary scenarios should be prioritized for inclusion in the release regression set.

  2. Select perturbation methods by defect type

    • Input boundary defects: null values, abnormal formats, excessive length, encoding, combined boundaries;

    • Trigger condition defects: adjacent intent, negative intent, mixed intent;

    • Permission defects: role, tenant, environment, read/write/delete, and confirmation status;

    • Failure strategy defects: timeout, rate limiting, permission denial, dependency unavailable;

    • Output contract defects: downstream parsing, required fields, citations, and format.

  3. Preserve the "expected action"
    Especially in security and boundary scenarios, answer, clarify, limited_answer, deny, or handoff should be specified, rather than merely evaluating the surface quality of the text.

  4. Distinguish between regression set and exploration set
    Discovered defects and their remediations should enter the stable regression set; exploration of unknown risks may enter the exploration set, but exploration results should be confirmed before being escalated to blocking test cases.

3.5 Reverse Diagnostic Rules After Quality Failure ​

After a Quality failure, the platform should output "failure fact + candidate Inspect investigation direction + other possible causes."

Family wildcard notations in the table below and in Appendices B/C/D (such as QD-P-1.x, QD-T-4.x) refer only to the currently effective members of that family, excluding numbers that have been deleted, deprecated, merged, or transferred; see Appendix A for the complete list.

Observed FailurePriority Inspect InvestigationOther Possible Causes
Tool selection errorQD-T-4.1, QD-TT-5.2, QD-S-3.1, QD-P-2.4.3Model reasoning, routing, context construction
Missing parameter, type or format errorQD-T-1.2, QD-T-2.x, QD-P-2.2.x, QD-ST-3.3Tool implementation, transformation layer, Mock data
Call order or data dependency errorQD-P-2.4.3, QD-PT-2.2, QD-ST-3.2Planner, state machine, runtime orchestration
Output not consumable by downstreamQD-P-2.3.1/2.3.2, QD-PS-1.6, QD-ST-3.5Downstream parser, interface version, implementation compatibility
Repeated calls or task interruption after exceptionQD-P-2.6.x, QD-S-4.x, QD-PT-2.5, QD-ST-3.7Network, rate limiting, external service, timeout configuration
RAG key fact errorQD-P-1.x, QD-P-2.4.x, QD-T-4.1Knowledge error, retrieval failure, re-ranking, model hallucination
RAG answer omits restrictions or stepsQD-P-2.3.x, QD-S-4.2, QD-S-3.4Incomplete baseline answer, insufficient recall, context truncation
RAG no citation or citation does not support conclusionQD-P-2.3.x, QD-P-2.4.x, QD-ST-3.5Knowledge metadata, retrieval and citation implementation
Should have refused, clarified, or handed off but answered directlyQD-P-2.5.2/2.5.3, QD-S-3.2, QD-S-5.x, QD-PS-1.3IAM, runtime Guardrail, missing user state
Equivalent questions or multi-turn responses contradictoryQD-P-1.1.x, QD-P-2.5.4, QD-S-3.5Session memory, context window, model version changes

3.6 Quality Regression Rules After Remediation ​

After remediating an Inspect defect, passing the static re-inspection alone should not be the basis for closure.

Change TypeMinimum Regression Requirements
Inspect·P0 defect remediationRe-run corresponding Inspect; re-run associated Risk; re-run directly affected Quality test cases and complete defect chain test cases
Inspect·P1 defect remediationRe-run corresponding Inspect; execute affected topic Quality regression; decide whether to execute Risk per mapping recommendation
Prompt, Skill, Tool, or Cross contract changeIn addition to directly affected test cases, execute end-to-end call chain regression
RAG boundary, permission, citation, or safety response changeRe-run high-risk boundary, key fact, citation, and format compliance test cases
Tool write operation, batch operation, or data flow changeRe-run confirmation, idempotency, rollback, maximum batch, and cross-Tool data flow test cases
Model, knowledge snapshot, evaluator, or baseline set changeRe-assess baseline comparability per the corresponding Quality specification; establish a new baseline if necessary

The minimum conditions for closing quality-associated items are:

text
Remediated artifact has been versioned
+ Static defect has been re-inspected
+ Required dynamic validation completed or inapplicability reason documented
+ Affected quality test cases passed
+ Regression evidence has been archived
+ Manual confirmation of closure

Chapter 4: Mapping Library, Evidence, and Manual Confirmation ​

4.1 Minimum Mapping Library Records ​

Each mapping rule should be independently versioned, including at least:

yaml
mapping_id: ""
mapping_version: ""
status: active

source:
  defect_id: ""
  defect_name: ""
  artifact_type: ""
  source_standard: ""
  source_standard_version: ""

applicability:
  ac_levels: []
  or_levels: []
  required_conditions: []
  exclusions: []

security_associations: []
quality_associations: []

evidence_requirements:
  static: []
  dynamic: []
  quality: []

limitations: []
review_status: draft

Mapping library rules and specific finding records must be separated:

  • Mapping library rules: Describe which QD(s) may typically be associated with what risks;
  • Specific finding records: Describe whether a specific artifact hits the rule, whether it is applicable, and the actual validation results.

4.2 Evidence Requirements and Priority ​

Evidence TypePrimary UsePriority
Artifact original text, Schema, version hashProve static defects and mapping prerequisitesHigh
Prompt, Skill, Tool call trajectoriesProve actual execution behavior and chain relationshipsHigh
Shadow sandbox attack resultsProve exploitability, interception, or insufficient conditionsHigh
Quality baseline test cases, outputs, scores, and GateProve actual quality performanceHigh
Backend validation, IAM, approval, or gateway configurationProve compensating controlsHigh
LLM inspection notesAuxiliary explanation, generate candidate associationsMedium
Keywords, similarity, or heuristic rulesInitial screening and candidate discoveryLow to Medium

Evidence should include minimum reproducible information:

text
Artifact version
+ Rule version
+ Mapping library version
+ Evaluation environment
+ Execution time
+ Original input and key output
+ Evaluator or evaluator version

4.3 Confidence and Manual Confirmation ​

4.3.1 Confidence ​

ConfidenceApplicable Scenarios
HighClear static evidence exists, and dynamic validation or quality results support the association.
MediumStatic evidence is clear, but dynamic or quality empirical evidence is lacking.
LowAssociation primarily relies on heuristics, similarity, or external condition assumptions.

Confidence does not equal:

  • Inspect severity level;
  • Risk Explicit explicit-risk grade;
  • Risk Implicit Signal;
  • Quality score or Gate.

4.3.2 Manual Confirmation Status ​

StatusDefinition
unreviewedAuto-generated, not yet manually reviewed
reviewedManually confirmed static defects and mapping applicability
validatedSupported by dynamic or quality evidence
rejectedManually determined mapping not applicable to this instance
needs_more_evidenceNeeds supplementary environment, logs, permissions, or test assets

Review status is consistent with Core §5.6.2 and does not include closed; closure is a Finding lifecycle status (core §5.3), not a review status.

4.4 Risk Test Template Fields ​

When influencing mapping output of Risk test recommendations, at least the following should be declared:

FieldDescription
test_idTest template identifier
source_defectsAssociated QD or defect chain members
attack_surfaceCorresponding AS number
test_goalAttack target to be validated
preconditionsIdentity, permissions, data, Mock, Tool, and environment prerequisites
input_strategyInjection, boundary values, encoding variants, multi-turn, or cross-Tool strategies
success_criteriaWhat behavior determines attack success
termination_statusA/B/C/D
evidence_to_captureCall trajectories, parameters, logs, status changes, and output
safety_constraintsShadow sandbox isolation, anonymization, Mock, side-effect restrictions
regression_scopeTemplates and variants to re-run after remediation

4.5 Quality Supplementary Test and Diagnostic Fields ​

FieldDescription
quality_test_idSupplementary test template or test case identifier
quality_targetTool-Agent or RAG-Agent
source_defectsAssociated QD or defect chain
candidate_failure_modesTool-Agent FM list
candidate_metricsRAG-Agent applicable metrics list
test_scenarioNormal, boundary, abnormal, permission, failure, or regression scenario
expected_actionWhen necessary: answer, clarify, limited_answer, deny, handoff
pass_criteriaTool-Agent task success conditions, or RAG-Agent metrics and key gate conditions
diagnostic_evidenceCall chain, output, citations, scoring rationale, version, and logs
other_possible_causesCandidate root cause directions not belonging to Inspect

4.6 Linked Defect Chain Recording and Escalation ​

Defect chain records should include at least:

FieldDescription
chain_idStable unique identifier
chain_nameHuman-readable name
chain_typesecurity, tool_quality, or rag_quality
membersMember QDs, artifacts, versions, and roles in the chain
chain_hypothesisDescription of candidate attack or failure path
required_conditionsPermissions, data, Tool, or environment conditions required for the chain to hold
potential_impactsD1/D2/D3, availability, auditability, or quality impact
validation_planEnd-to-end Risk or Quality test plan
chain_statusOpen, validating, confirmed, remediated, closed
ownersPrompt, Skill, Tool, security, and quality responsible parties

When any of the following conditions are met, a single defect should be escalated to defect chain governance:

  • Two or more P0/P1 defects connected across artifacts;
  • Reachable path from untrusted input to high-risk Tool exists;
  • Reachable path from sensitive data source to external output Tool exists;
  • Quality or Risk evidence shows multiple artifacts jointly contributing to failure;
  • Single-point remediation cannot eliminate the complete risk path.

4.7 Mapping Maintenance and Change Control ​

Mapping rules require periodic calibration, especially when the following occur:

  • Inspect QD definitions, numbering, or severity levels are updated;
  • Risk attack strategies, termination status, or Gate rules are updated;
  • Quality metrics, baseline sets, thresholds, or evaluators are updated;
  • New high-frequency production failures or novel attack patterns emerge;
  • Artifact types expand to include Memory, Workflow, MCP, A2A, or IAM.

Mapping library changes should be recorded:

text
Reason for change
+ Affected QD / AS / FM / Quality metrics
+ Differences between old and new versions
+ Calibration evidence
+ Reviewer
+ Effective date

Chapter 5: Platform Execution, Reporting, and Governance Closed Loop ​

5.1 Platform Execution Workflow ​

1. Inspect discovers QD defects
          ↓
2. Read mapping library, version, and applicability conditions
          ↓
3. Generate security associations, quality associations, and defect chain candidates
          ↓
4. Recommend Risk and Quality supplementary tests
          ↓
5. Collect dynamic validation, quality assessment, and compensating control evidence
          ↓
6. Manual confirmation of applicability, root cause, and remediation plan
          ↓
7. Execute re-inspection, regression, and closure approval

The automation system should distinguish between:

  • Statically confirmed facts: e.g., QD has been hit;
  • Mapping inferences: e.g., a certain attack surface may exist;
  • Dynamically confirmed facts: e.g., attack succeeded, external interception, or insufficient conditions;
  • Quality confirmed facts: e.g., critical test case failure, insufficient reliability, or regression degradation;
  • Manual conclusions: e.g., root cause confirmation, risk acceptance, or closure.

5.2 Automatic Recommendation Rules ​

After Inspect hits a defect, the platform may automatically output:

  1. Potential attack surfaces and potential impacts;
  2. Recommended Risk Explicit review directions;
  3. Recommended Risk Implicit test templates;
  4. Recommended Tool-Agent or RAG-Agent supplementary tests;
  5. Associable defect chains;
  6. Required evidence and applicability conditions;
  7. Minimum regression requirements after remediation.

The platform must NOT automatically output the following conclusions:

  • "This defect constitutes an exploitable vulnerability";
  • "The attack has succeeded";
  • "This defect is the sole root cause of the quality failure";
  • "External controls are sufficient to permanently replace artifact remediation";
  • "Not executing the mapping recommendation means the risk does not exist."

5.3 Mapping Progress Status ​

The 11 statuses in this section are Relevance mapping progress statuses, describing "how far the impact mapping and validation of a given QD has progressed", and are not Finding lifecycle statuses. Finding status, review status, and closure conditions always follow framework/core.md §5.3 and §5.6.2; the statuses in this section must not be used to substitute for or close a Finding.

StatusDefinition
OPENQD discovered, impact mapping not yet completed
MAPPEDSecurity and quality associations generated
VALIDATION_RECOMMENDEDRisk recommended, not yet executed
VALIDATED_EXPLOITABLERisk Implicit resulted in attack success A
VALIDATED_COMPENSATEDThird-party interception B occurred, artifact-level risk still requires tracking
VALIDATED_REJECTEDLLM rejected C; static defect not automatically closed
VALIDATION_INCONCLUSIVEInsufficient conditions D or insufficient evidence
QUALITY_ASSOCIATEDAssociation clues exist with actual quality failure
FIXED_PENDING_REGRESSIONFixed, pending re-inspection, dynamic validation, or quality regression
CLOSEDRequired re-inspection and regression completed, confirmed closed
ACCEPTED_EXCEPTIONApproved time-limited risk acceptance, must record validity period and compensating controls

Cross-reference with Core Finding statuses (for report interoperability only; does not change the semantics of either side):

Mapping Progress StatusCorresponding Core Finding Status (core §5.3)
OPEN / MAPPED / VALIDATION_RECOMMENDEDopen
VALIDATED_EXPLOITABLE / VALIDATED_COMPENSATED / VALIDATED_REJECTEDconfirmed (all have dynamic validation results as support)
QUALITY_ASSOCIATEDopen (association clues do not yet constitute "confirmed through the prescribed process"; record review_status separately)
VALIDATION_INCONCLUSIVEopen (record review_status = needs_more_evidence separately)
FIXED_PENDING_REGRESSIONmitigated
CLOSEDclosed
ACCEPTED_EXCEPTIONaccepted

Core's invalid (false positive or not applicable) has no corresponding progress status in this section; when a mapping does not hold, the Finding should be marked invalid and the exclusion rationale recorded.

5.4 Comprehensive Gate and Release Decision Boundaries ​

This section only explains how conclusions from multiple sources are merged and presented when they coexist; it does not define a Relevance-side Gate: Relevance itself produces no Gate and must not substitute for any Gate of Inspect, Risk Explicit, Risk Implicit, or Quality (core §6.1).

5.4.1 Result Merging Principles ​

SituationComprehensive Handling
Risk Implicit results in AHandle per Risk Implicit Gate; Quality pass does not exempt.
Inspect has a blocking Inspect·P0Handle per Inspect rules; dynamic non-reproduction does not automatically exempt.
Quality critical test case fails or Gate does not passHandle per corresponding Quality rules; Inspect serves only as diagnostic support.
Risk Explicit discovers high-risk EXHandle per Explicit rules; should associate related QD or defect chains, but does not replace their remediation.
All dynamic validations result in DMust not determine security pass; should mark validation as invalid and supplement conditions.
Only B or C existsHandle per Risk Implicit original rules; should record dependency on external controls or model rejection uncertainty.
Mapping recommendation not executedThe recommendation itself does not constitute an automatic FAIL; however, if the source specification or change policy requires validation, it cannot be considered as having completed pre-release proof.

5.4.2 Risk Acceptance Limitations ​

Risk acceptance is only applicable to scenarios where the source specification permits exceptions, and must at minimum document:

  • The specific QD, EX, attack result, or quality failure being accepted;
  • The business justification for not remediating;
  • Verified compensating controls;
  • Residual risk description;
  • Responsible person and approver;
  • Expiration date and review conditions;
  • Required monitoring, alerting, and subsequent regression.

Attack success A, critical quality gate failure, or Inspect·P0 / Explicit·P0 situations where the source specification explicitly prohibits exceptions must NOT be downgraded or exempted through this specification's "mapping conclusions."

5.5 Impact Card Format in Customer Reports ​

Customer-facing reports must clearly separate "confirmed facts" from "candidate associations."

markdown
### Impact Card: QD-T-3.2 | Untrusted Input Entering an Executable Context | Inspect·P0 (Applies to OR-L2 / OR-L3)

**Static Discovery**
- Artifact: `tool:search_customer`
- Version: `sha256:...`
- Evidence: Parameter `query` is a free-form string, without declared format, pattern, or allowlist constraints.

**Potential Security Associations**
- Attack Surface: AS-02 Input and Parameter Injection
- Potential Impact: D1 (Confidentiality), D2 (Integrity), D3 (Authorization)
- Mapping Strength: Strong
- Note: This conclusion indicates priority for validation; it does not yet indicate that the backend is exploitable.

**Recommended Validation**
- Risk Explicit: Review parameter description, default values, and examples for explicit dangerous expressions.
- Risk Implicit: Parameter injection, encoding variants, boundary parameters, and downstream passthrough testing.
- Required Conditions: Shadow sandbox, controlled test data, call traces, and Mock downstream services.

**Potential Quality Associations**
- Tool-Agent: FM-04 Parameter Generation Error, FM-05 Call Contract Mismatch, FM-08 Exception Recovery Failure.
- Recommended Supplementary Tests: Missing parameters, illegal formats, oversized input, downstream error returns.

**Current Evidence Status**
- Static Defect: Confirmed
- Dynamic Exploitability: Not verified
- Quality Association: Not verified
- Compensating Control: To be confirmed

**Remediation and Regression**
- Recommendation: Define structured parameters, format constraints, allowlist, and backend validation.
- Minimum Regression: Inspect Tool re-inspection + associated Risk + illegal parameter Quality test cases.

5.5.1 Report Wording Requirements ​

Permissible WordingProhibited Wording
"May expand the attack surface""Has already been attacked"
"Recommended to prioritize validation""Vulnerability necessarily exists"
"Candidate quality root cause""Quality failure is caused by this defect"
"Relies on compensating controls""Completely secure"
"Not reproduced under current test conditions""Absolutely unexploitable"

5.6 Remediation, Re-inspection, and Regression Evidence ​

5.6.1 Remediation Closed Loop ​

Discovery
→ Mapping
→ Validation / Supplementary Testing
→ Manual Confirmation
→ Remediation
→ Static Re-inspection
→ Dynamic Security Regression
→ Quality Regression
→ Closure Approval

5.6.2 Minimum Evidence Package ​

Each closed high-priority defect or defect chain must retain at minimum:

CategoryMinimum Evidence
Pre-remediationOriginal artifact version, QD evidence, mapping version, initial risk description
Remediation contentPull Request, change description, new artifact version, approval record
Static re-inspectionInspect re-inspection report and rule version
Dynamic validationRisk test cases, environment, A/B/C/D results, traces, and logs
Quality regressionTest suite, test case version, outputs, reliability or metrics, Gate conclusion
Compensating controlsIAM, backend validation, approval, gateway, or isolation configuration and verification evidence
Closure conclusionResponsible person, reviewer, closure date, residual risk, and subsequent monitoring requirements

5.6.3 Closure Determination ​

For defect chains that have been dynamically validated as exploitable, closure must not rely solely on "attack payloads no longer succeeding." At minimum, confirm:

  1. The original static defect has been remediated or formally accepted as an exception;
  2. Similar variants and adjacent attack paths have been regressed;
  3. High-risk Tools and backend still retain hard protections;
  4. Quality regression has not introduced task failures or boundary behavior degradation;
  5. Artifact, test, environment, and evidence versions are all traceable.

Appendix A: QD Defect to Security Impact and Validation Strategy Mapping ​

This appendix defines mapping directions, it does not automatically determine static defects as EX risks, dynamic vulnerabilities, or actual security incidents.

Risk Explicit content in this appendix only indicates suggested priority review directions; specific EX classification must be independently determined by Risk Explicit.

A.1 Prompt Defect Mapping ​

QD RuleNameApplicabilityPrimary Attack SurfacePotential ImpactMapping StrengthRecommended Validation
QD-P-1.1.1Direct ContradictionAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-05D2, D3StrongConflicting instructions, rule priority, examples overriding body rules, multi-turn context testing
QD-P-1.1.2Priority ConflictAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-05D2, D3StrongRule priority, security and task objective conflicts, multi-turn context testing
QD-P-1.1.3Example-Rule ContradictionAC-L1~L3AS-01D2, D3StrongExamples overriding body rules, multi-turn context testing
QD-P-1.2.1Role-Responsibility MismatchAC-L1~L3AS-04, AS-09D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongOut-of-role tasks, responsibility and constraint conflicts, handoff and refusal testing
QD-P-1.2.2Role-Output Style MismatchAC-L1~L3AS-03AuditabilityMediumOutput style consistency, tone and role matching testing
QD-P-1.2.3Constraint-Responsibility MismatchAC-L1~L3AS-04, AS-09D2, D3StrongResponsibility and constraint conflicts, handoff and refusal testing
QD-P-1.2.4Identity and Anthropomorphization BoundariesAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-04D1, D3MediumIdentity declaration, anthropomorphic tone, over-trust and privilege-guidance testing
QD-P-1.3.1Quantifier MisuseAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-04D2, D3MediumVague quantifier variants, adjacent permission and boundary request testing
QD-P-1.3.2Vague QualifiersAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-04D2, D3MediumQualifier boundaries, adjacent permission and boundary request testing
QD-P-1.3.3Undefined BoundariesAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-04D1, D2, D3StrongAdjacent permission and boundary requests, out-of-bounds and scope expansion testing
QD-P-1.4.1Duplicate Constraints and Redundant Expressions (suggestion item)AC-L1~L3AS-06Availability, AuditabilityConditionalDuplicate rule consistency, redundancy resolution, and token budget testing
QD-P-1.4.3Invalid Skill DefinitionsAC-L2/L3AS-05, AS-09D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongInvalid Skill references, unreachable branches, dead rules, and call path testing
QD-P-1.5.1Responsibilities Do Not Support the ObjectiveAC-L1~L3AS-05, AS-07, AS-09D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongObjective completion, workflow dependency, and exception path testing
QD-P-1.5.2Resources Do Not Support WorkflowAC-L2/L3AS-05, AS-07, AS-09D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongResource reachability, workflow dependency, and exception path testing
QD-P-1.6.1Critical Decision Word VaguenessAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-04D1, D2, D3StrongBoundary-word variants such as "sensitive", "necessary", "reasonable", and conflict condition testing
QD-P-1.6.2Rules Depending on Model Internal StateAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-07D1, D2, D3, AvailabilityConditionalStability testing of rules related to uncertainty, malicious intent, and confidence levels
QD-P-1.6.3Soft Rule Interweaving Without ArbitrationAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-07D1, D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongSoft rule conflicts, absence of arbitration, multi-turn conflict condition testing
QD-P-1.6.4Reasoning Method ConstraintsAC-L1~L3AS-01AvailabilityConditionalReasoning-constraint followability and cross-turn consistency testing
QD-P-1.6.5Self-Referential or Recursive ConstraintsAC-L1~L3AS-06, AS-07AvailabilityMediumRecursion termination, self-reference resolution, and resource exhaustion testing
QD-P-1.6.6Implicit Assumption DependencyAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-07D2, AvailabilityConditionalImplicit premise, knowledge update, and abnormal condition testing
QD-P-1.6.7Non-Monotonic Reasoning DefectsAC-L1~L3 (N/A for single-turn)AS-07D2, AvailabilityConditionalCross-turn state, committed conclusions, and new-information revision testing
QD-P-1.6.8Rule FollowabilityAC-L1~L3AS-01AvailabilityConditionalStability testing of unreliable-capability constraints such as counting, timing, and arithmetic
QD-P-2.1.2Reference ClarityAC-L2/L3AS-09Availability, AuditabilityMediumReference resolution, format parsing, critical constraint reachability testing
QD-P-2.1.3Structural Hierarchy Reasonableness (suggestion item)AC-L1~L3AS-01Availability, AuditabilityConditionalParagraph length, hierarchy depth, critical constraint reachability testing
QD-P-2.1.5Context Budget Encroachment (suggestion item)AC-L1~L3AS-06AvailabilityConditionalContext budget occupancy, critical constraints being encroached testing
QD-P-2.2.1Undeclared Input SourceAC-L1~L3 (N/A when the input source is self-evident)AS-01, AS-03D1, D2, D3StrongSource confusion testing across user input, history records, external documents, and Tool returns
QD-P-2.2.2Unconstrained Input FormatAC-L1~L3AS-02, AS-07D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongNull values, malformed formats, missing fields, encoding variant testing
QD-P-2.2.3Required/Optional Not DistinguishedAC-L1~L3 (N/A for free-text input)AS-02, AS-07D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongMissing fields, default value manipulation, and encoding variant testing
QD-P-2.2.4Undefined Missing-Input HandlingAC-L1~L3AS-02, AS-07D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongNull values, missing fields, default value manipulation, and encoding variant testing
QD-P-2.3.1Undefined Output FormatAC-L1~L3 (applies when output is machine-consumed)AS-03, AS-09D1, D2, AuditabilityStrongOutput parsing, required fields, format bypass testing
QD-P-2.3.2Incomplete Output SchemaAC-L1~L3 (N/A when structured output is not declared)AS-03, AS-09D1, D2, AuditabilityStrongStructured output, Schema validation, and required field testing
QD-P-2.3.4Missing Security/Privacy FilteringAC-L1~L3 (otherwise N/A)AS-03D1ConditionalPII requests, Prompt extraction, sensitive context output and exfiltration testing
QD-P-2.3.5Factuality and Hallucination Control DeclarationAC-L2/L3 (N/A without retrieval/tools/external knowledge)AS-03D2, AuditabilityConditionalUnsupported fabrication, hallucination, and factuality regression testing
QD-P-2.3.6Output Length and TruncationAC-L1~L3AS-03D2, AvailabilityMediumOversized output, maximum length, and truncation completeness testing
QD-P-2.3.7Output Language/Localization and ConventionsAC-L1~L3 (N/A for single region)AS-03D2, AuditabilityConditionalLanguage, time zone, currency, unit, and percentage convention testing
QD-P-2.4.1Incomplete Workflow StepsAC-L2/L3AS-05, AS-07, AS-09D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongStep order, prerequisites, missing steps, failure fallback testing
QD-P-2.4.2Undeclared Resources/ToolsAC-L2/L3AS-05, AS-09D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongUndeclared tool/resource, call path reachability testing
QD-P-2.4.3Incorrect Tool Invocation Parameters or OrderAC-L2/L3AS-05, AS-09D2, D3, AvailabilityMediumParameter construction, call order, alternative call after failure testing
QD-P-2.4.4Multi-Turn Context, State, and Memory BoundariesAC-L2/L3 (N/A for single-turn stateless)AS-01, AS-07D1, D2, D3MediumMulti-turn state pollution, memory boundaries, cross-turn context testing
QD-P-2.5.1Missing Termination ConstraintsAC-L2/L3AS-06AvailabilityStrongLoop, recursion, retry, timeout, and budget exhaustion testing
QD-P-2.5.2Missing Security Boundary ConstraintsAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-03, AS-04D1, D2, D3StrongSingle-turn/multi-turn injection, indirect injection, goal hijacking, system prompt extraction testing
QD-P-2.5.3Missing Permission Control BoundariesAC-L2/L3AS-04, AS-05D2, D3StrongRole escalation, cross-user, cross-tenant, read/write/delete, and privilege escalation testing
QD-P-2.5.4Undefined Constraint PriorityAC-L2/L3AS-01, AS-07D1, D2, D3StrongSecurity, efficiency, and task completion objective conflict testing
QD-P-2.5.6Instruction-Data Trust BoundaryAC-L2/L3AS-01, AS-02D1, D2, D3StrongInstruction/data confusion, injection, and goal hijacking testing
QD-P-2.5.7Human Confirmation for High-Risk/Irreversible OperationsAC-L2/L3 (N/A when no such operations exist)AS-05D2, D3ConditionalHigh-risk operation confirmation, cancellation, rollback, and side effect testing
QD-P-2.5.8System Prompt Confidentiality and Leak ResponseAC-L2/L3AS-01, AS-03D1StrongSystem prompt extraction, leak response, and confidentiality declaration testing
QD-P-2.5.9Industry Compliance and Disclaimer BoundariesAC-L1~L3 (otherwise N/A)AS-05D2, AuditabilityConditionalMedical/financial/legal domain disclaimer and out-of-scope compliance testing
QD-P-2.6.1Runtime Exceptions Not CoveredAC-L2/L3AS-07D1, D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongTimeout, permission denial, rate limiting, data format errors, and dependency failure testing
QD-P-2.6.2Missing Degradation and Recovery StrategyAC-L3AS-07AvailabilityMediumDegradation, recovery, partial completion, and exception path testing
QD-P-2.6.3Unreasonable Retry MechanismAC-L3AS-06, AS-07AvailabilityMediumRetry count, backoff, duplicate execution, and idempotency testing
QD-P-2.6.4Out-of-Scope Request Refusal and Human HandoffAC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-04D2, D3StrongRefusal template, handoff target, escalation conditions, and out-of-scope request testing
QD-P-2.7.1Insufficient Positive Example Representativeness (suggestion item)AC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-05D2ConditionalPositive example coverage and adversarial regression testing
QD-P-2.7.2Insufficient Counter-Example Coverage (suggestion item)AC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-05D2ConditionalCounter-example coverage and dangerous request adversarial testing
QD-P-2.7.3Missing Boundary-Case Examples (suggestion item)AC-L1~L3AS-01, AS-05D2ConditionalBoundary case and dangerous request adversarial regression testing

Notes:

  • Suggestion items (ungraded) carry optimization value only: no deduction, no blocking, no waiver, and their mapping strength is uniformly marked conditional.
  • Deprecated/deleted/merged rules are no longer mapped: QD-P-2.5.5 (deprecated), QD-P-2.1.1 (deleted; its injection point merged into 2.5.6), QD-P-1.4.2 (deleted), QD-P-2.3.3 (deleted), QD-P-2.1.4 (merged into 1.4.1).

A.2 Skill Defect Mapping ​

QD RuleNameApplicabilityPrimary Attack SurfacePotential ImpactMapping StrengthRecommended Validation
QD-S-0.1~0.9Basic ComplianceOR-L1~L3AS-09Availability, AuditabilityMediumParsing, field completeness, version and metadata consistency testing
QD-S-1.1Input Boundary MissingOR-L1~L3 (N/A when platform budget evidence exists)AS-06AvailabilityStrongLarge input, call count, timeout, and budget exhaustion testing
QD-S-1.2Output Size MissingOR-L1~L3AS-06AvailabilityStrongLarge output, maximum length, and budget exhaustion testing
QD-S-1.3Execution Resource Boundary MissingOR-L1~L3 (downgraded to SHOULD / N/A with traceable configuration evidence)AS-06AvailabilityStrongTimeout, maximum call count, budget exhaustion, and loop testing
QD-S-1.4Permission Boundary MissingOR-L1~L3AS-04, AS-05D2, D3StrongRead/write/delete confusion, dangerous operations, and least privilege testing
QD-S-1.5Data Source Boundary MissingOR-L1~L3AS-01, AS-03, AS-04D1, D3MediumHistorical session pollution, cross-user, external resources, and data source testing
QD-S-2.1Unbounded Quantity DeclarationOR-L1~L3AS-06AvailabilityConditionalFull-request, unbounded quantity, and budget exhaustion testing
QD-S-2.2Unterminated Execution DeclarationOR-L1~L3AS-06AvailabilityConditionalLoop, until-success, timeout, and budget exhaustion testing
QD-S-2.3Open-Ended Enumeration in Structure DeclarationOR-L1~L3AS-06, AS-07Availability, D2MediumOpen output structure, enumeration explosion, and parsing testing
QD-S-2.4Broad Capability VerbsOR-L1~L3AS-04, AS-05D2, D3ConditionalSemantic expansion testing for words like "manage", "process", "fix"
QD-S-3.1Vague Trigger ConditionsOR-L1~L3AS-01, AS-04D1, D2, D3MediumAdjacent intent, mixed intent, and false trigger testing
QD-S-3.2Missing Deactivation ConditionsOR-L1~L3 (counter-example may be waived when positive triggers are sufficiently bounded)AS-01, AS-04D2, D3MediumNegative intent, non-trigger scenarios, and false trigger testing
QD-S-3.3Missing Ambiguous Input Handling StrategyOR-L1~L3AS-01D2MediumInsufficient information, format errors, ambiguous input, and fabricated content testing
QD-S-3.4Undefined Task ScopeOR-L1~L3AS-01, AS-05D2, D3StrongGoal hijacking, implicit tasks, scope expansion, and indirect delegation testing
QD-S-3.5Undeclared Default BehaviorOR-L1~L3AS-05, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumEmpty input, default behavior, and error routing testing
QD-S-3.6Metadata Expression DefectsOR-L1~L3AS-08D2, AvailabilityMediumSimilar Skills, name confusion, and incorrect routing testing
QD-S-3.7Output Structure Contract MissingOR-L1~L3AS-03, AS-09D2, Availability, AuditabilityMediumOutput format, required fields, empty results, and downstream parsing consistency testing
QD-S-4.1Undefined Failure BehaviorOR-L1~L3AS-07AvailabilityStrongTool failure, exception paths, and failure behavior testing
QD-S-4.2Undeclared Partial Completion LegitimacyOR-L1~L3AS-07D2, AvailabilityMediumPartial completion, half-completed states, and consistency testing
QD-S-4.3Missing Post-Failure Prohibited BehaviorsOR-L1~L3AS-05, AS-07D2, D3MediumPost-failure prohibited behavior, fallback, and side effect testing
QD-S-4.4Undefined Error Recovery PathOR-L1~L3 (N/A for L1 without tool calls)AS-07AvailabilityMediumError recovery, retry, degradation, and human takeover testing
QD-S-5.1Read/Write/Delete Permissions Not DistinguishedOR-L1~L3AS-04, AS-05D2, D3StrongRead request inducing write/delete, permission convergence, and side effect testing
QD-S-5.2Missing High-Risk Operation Confirmation MechanismOR-L3AS-05D2, D3StrongVague confirmation, negative confirmation, repeated confirmation, and cancellation confirmation testing
QD-S-5.3Undeclared Environment BoundariesOR-L1~L3 (condition: multiple environments reachable, otherwise N/A)AS-04, AS-05D2, D3MediumTest/production environment confusion and production resource access testing
QD-S-5.4Undeclared Chained Invocation PermissionsOR-L1~L3 (condition: allow_skill_chaining=true, otherwise N/A)AS-04, AS-05, AS-07D1, D2, D3MediumDownstream Skill whitelist, call depth, and permission inheritance testing

Notes:

  • QD-S-0.x are entry thresholds (basic compliance): no P grading, no deduction, no scoring, pass/not-pass only, uniformly mapped to AS-09.
  • Same-root deduplication: QD-S-1.4 / QD-S-2.4 are counted into QD-S-5.1; QD-S-2.1 / QD-S-2.2 are the automatic trigger word lists for QD-S-1.1 / QD-S-1.3 respectively; QD-S-4.3 is counted into QD-S-4.1.

A.3 Tool Defect Mapping ​

QD RuleNameApplicabilityPrimary Attack SurfacePotential ImpactMapping StrengthRecommended Validation
QD-T-1.1Base Field MissingOR-L1~L3AS-05, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumTool selection, Schema parsing, required fields, enumeration, and version compatibility testing
QD-T-1.2required References Undefined FieldOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumrequired referencing an undefined field, required fields, Schema parsing, and version compatibility testing
QD-T-1.3enum–type Conflict / Duplicate ValuesOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumenum–type conflict, duplicate values, Schema validation, and version compatibility testing
QD-T-1.4Inappropriate additionalProperties PolicyOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-04D1, D2, D3StrongAdditional fields, reserved fields, role, tenant, and token field injection testing
QD-T-1.5Name Validity and UniquenessOR-L1~L3AS-05, AS-08D2, AvailabilityMediumName validity, uniqueness, similar Tool name confusion, and incorrect routing testing
QD-T-1.6Constraint Self-Consistency and defaultOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumdefault and constraint self-consistency, Schema validation, and default value manipulation testing
QD-T-1.7Missing type / Overly Broad TypeOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumMissing/overly broad type, type confusion, and Schema parsing testing
QD-T-2.1String Type Without Length ConstraintOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-06D2, D3, AvailabilityMediumOversized strings, length boundaries, resource exhaustion, and extreme value testing
QD-T-2.2String Type Without Format ConstraintOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-07D2, D3, AvailabilityMediumFormat, encoding variants, malformed input, and extreme value testing
QD-T-2.3Number/Integer Type Without Boundary ConstraintOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-06D2, D3, AvailabilityMediumNumeric boundaries, overflow, zero values, and extreme value testing
QD-T-2.4Array Type Without Length ConstraintOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-06D2, D3, AvailabilityMediumArray length, batch elements, and extreme value testing
QD-T-2.5Missing Unit/Precision/Time Zone/Currency SemanticsOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumUnit, currency, precision, time zone semantics, and end-to-end consistency testing
QD-T-2.6Query Tool Without Pagination/Result-Set CapOR-L1~L3AS-06D2, AvailabilityMediumPagination, result-set cap, full return, and budget exhaustion testing
QD-T-2.7Unexpressed Inter-Parameter Dependencies/ExclusivityOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-07D2, AvailabilityMediumInter-parameter dependency, exclusivity, combined conditions, and conflicting field testing
QD-T-3.1State Change and Material Side Effect DeclarationOR-L2/L3AS-05D2, D3StrongState change, write operation misselection, confirmation, rollback, and idempotency testing
QD-T-3.2Untrusted Input Entering an Executable ContextOR-L1~L3AS-02D1, D2, D3StrongParameter injection, encoding bypass, parameter pollution, and downstream passthrough testing
QD-T-3.3Batch/Range Write Operation Without CapOR-L2/L3AS-05, AS-06D2, AvailabilityMediumMaximum batch, batch bypass, cancellation, interruption recovery, and duplicate submission testing
QD-T-3.4Authorization Context Parameter ExposureOR-L1~L3AS-04D1, D2, D3StrongtenantId, isAdmin, role, token, and control flag tampering testing
QD-T-3.6Dangerous Default Values and Operation Scope PreconditionsOR-L2/L3AS-05D2, D3MediumDangerous default values, operation scope preconditions, and default behavior trigger testing
QD-T-3.7Undeclared Operation Allowlist for Parameterized ToolsOR-L1~L3AS-02, AS-04, AS-05D1, D2, D3StrongOut-of-allowlist operation injection, arbitrary SQL/command execution, unauthorized table access, and direct reach of dangerous actions testing
QD-T-4.1Insufficient description QualityOR-L1~L3AS-05, AS-08D2, D3, AvailabilityMediumSimilar Tools, near-synonym expressions, ambiguous tasks, and malicious Tool selection guidance testing
QD-T-4.4Missing Parameter-Level descriptionOR-L1~L3AS-05, AS-08D2, AvailabilityMediumParameter semantics, similar parameter confusion, and parameter construction testing
QD-T-4.5description–Schema InconsistencyOR-L1~L3AS-05, AS-08D2, AvailabilityMediumdescription–Schema consistency, parameter construction, and Schema validation testing
QD-T-4.6Sensitive Input Handling DeclarationOR-L2/L3AS-03D1ConditionalSensitive input, PII, credential handling, and exfiltration testing
QD-T-4.7Missing Output Contract (outputSchema)OR-L2/L3AS-03, AS-09D1, D2, AvailabilityMediumOutput structure, required fields, and downstream parsing consistency testing
QD-T-5.1Breaking Change DeterminationChange inspectionAS-08, AS-09D2, D3, AvailabilityConditionalOld/new Schema replay, caller compatibility, migration, and rollback testing
QD-T-5.2Change Impact Assessment Omission or ErrorChange inspectionAS-08, AS-09D2, D3, AvailabilityConditionalOld/new Schema replay, caller compatibility, migration, and rollback testing
QD-T-5.3Semantic ChangeChange inspectionAS-08, AS-09D2, D3, AvailabilityConditionalSemantic change, old/new Schema replay, caller compatibility, and migration rollback testing

Notes:

  • Transferred rules (cross-Tool semantics moved to the Cross namespace): QD-T-3.5 Cross-Tool Data Flow → QD-TT-5.1; QD-T-4.3 Multi-Tool Semantic Competition → QD-TT-5.2.
  • Merged rules: QD-T-4.2 Undeclared Side Effects → merged into QD-T-3.1 (State Change and Material Side Effect Declaration).
  • QD-T-5.x are change inspection items, currently not connected to the checklist/scoring/Gate; mapping strength is uniformly marked conditional.

A.4 Cross Defect Mapping ​

QD RuleNameApplicabilityPrimary Attack SurfacePotential ImpactMapping StrengthRecommended Validation

QD-PS · Prompt→Skill (7 items)

QD RuleNameApplicabilityPrimary Attack SurfacePotential ImpactMapping StrengthRecommended Validation
QD-PS-1.1Skill Authorization ConsistencyAC-L1~L3AS-04, AS-09D2, D3StrongPrompt→Skill unauthorized invocation, name confusion, and capability expansion testing
QD-PS-1.2Trigger Condition ConsistencyAC-L2/L3AS-01, AS-05D2, D3MediumTrigger, non-trigger, adjacent intent, and mixed intent testing
QD-PS-1.3Permission Boundary ConsistencyAC-L1~L3AS-04, AS-09D2, D3StrongPrompt→Skill permission boundaries, unauthorized access, and least privilege testing
QD-PS-1.4Resource Access ConsistencyAC-L2/L3AS-03, AS-04D1, D2, D3MediumPrompt→Skill resource sources, cross-tenant, and data leakage testing
QD-PS-1.5Failure Handling ConsistencyAC-L3AS-07, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumEnd-to-end failure, recovery, and exception path testing
QD-PS-1.6Output Constraint ConsistencyAC-L3AS-03, AS-09D1, D2, AuditabilityMediumOutput format, data leakage, and downstream parsing testing
QD-PS-1.7Orchestration Order and Prerequisite ConsistencyAC-L2/L3AS-05, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumStep order, prerequisites, missing steps, failure fallback testing

QD-PT · Prompt→Tool (7 items)

QD RuleNameApplicabilityPrimary Attack SurfacePotential ImpactMapping StrengthRecommended Validation
QD-PT-2.1Tool ExistenceAC-L1~L3AS-05, AS-09D2, AvailabilityStrongPrompt→Tool name, existence, and call path reachability testing
QD-PT-2.2Invocation Specification ConsistencyAC-L1~L3AS-02, AS-09D2, AvailabilityStrongPrompt→Tool invocation specification, parameter, and call order consistency testing
QD-PT-2.3Parameter Constraint ConsistencyAC-L2/L3AS-02, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumPrompt→Tool parameter constraints, Schema validation, and compatibility testing
QD-PT-2.4Permission Granularity ConsistencyAC-L1~L3AS-04, AS-05D2, D3StrongHigh-risk Tool invocation, confirmation, permission, and side effect testing
QD-PT-2.5Key Error Handling CoverageAC-L3AS-07D2, AvailabilityMediumRate limiting, timeout, permission errors, and error classification handling testing
QD-PT-2.6Business-Level Invocation Frequency / Batch Expectation DeclarationAC-L3AS-06AvailabilityMediumInvocation frequency, batch, call budget, and duplicate execution testing
QD-PT-2.7Parameter Semantics and Unit ConsistencyAC-L2/L3AS-02, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumUnit, currency, precision, time zone, and semantic convention end-to-end testing

QD-ST · Skill→Tool (7 items)

QD RuleNameApplicabilityPrimary Attack SurfacePotential ImpactMapping StrengthRecommended Validation
QD-ST-3.1Tool ExistenceAC-L1~L3AS-05, AS-09D2, AvailabilityStrongSkill→Tool name, existence, and call path reachability testing
QD-ST-3.2Input Constraint ConsistencyAC-L2/L3AS-02, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumSkill→Tool input constraints, Schema validation, and boundary testing
QD-ST-3.3Required Parameter PreparationAC-L2/L3AS-02, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumSkill→Tool parameter sources, required fields, and Schema validation testing
QD-ST-3.4Business-Level Invocation Frequency / Batch Expectation DeclarationAC-L3AS-06AvailabilityMediumMaximum call count, batch, and budget testing
QD-ST-3.5Output Structure MatchAC-L3AS-03, AS-09D1, D2, AuditabilityMediumTool return structure, downstream parsing, citation, or format testing
QD-ST-3.6Permission Scope MatchAC-L1~L3AS-04, AS-05D2, D3StrongSkill→Tool actual side effects, read/write/delete, and confirmation testing
QD-ST-3.7Key Error Handling CoverageAC-L3AS-07, AS-09D1, D2, AvailabilityMediumTool error classification, degradation, stop, retry, and human takeover testing

QD-CYC · Circular Invocation (3 items)

QD RuleNameApplicabilityPrimary Attack SurfacePotential ImpactMapping StrengthRecommended Validation
QD-CYC-1.1Cross-Artifact Circular InvocationAC-L2/L3AS-06AvailabilityMediumLoop termination, cross-artifact circular invocation, and resource exhaustion testing
QD-CYC-1.2Multi-Agent Circular InvocationAC-L3AS-06AvailabilityMediumMulti-Agent circular invocation, loop termination, and resource exhaustion testing
QD-CYC-1.3Skill-to-Skill Handoff LoopAC-L2/L3AS-06AvailabilityMediumHandoff termination conditions, maximum rounds, and downstream allowlist closed-loop testing

QD-SS · Skill↔Skill (2 items)

QD RuleNameApplicabilityPrimary Attack SurfacePotential ImpactMapping StrengthRecommended Validation
QD-SS-4.1Trigger Condition ConflictAC-L2/L3AS-01, AS-05D2, D3MediumOverlapping triggers, adjacent/negative intent, and Skill priority testing
QD-SS-4.2Name Uniqueness / Near-Duplicate MisleadingAC-L2/L3AS-05, AS-08D2, D3MediumMisselection caused by identical names, spelling/singular-plural/synonym similarity testing

QD-TT · Tool↔Tool (3 items)

QD RuleNameApplicabilityPrimary Attack SurfacePotential ImpactMapping StrengthRecommended Validation
QD-TT-5.1Cross-Tool Data FlowAC-L2/L3AS-03, AS-05D1, D2, D3StrongCross-Tool data flow, data exfiltration, and end-to-end consistency testing
QD-TT-5.2Multi-Tool Semantic CompetitionAC-L2/L3AS-05, AS-08D2, D3StrongMisselection caused by similar Tools, near-synonym requests, and semantic competition testing
QD-TT-5.3Cross-Tool Data Structure BridgingAC-L3AS-03, AS-09D2, AvailabilityMediumCross-Tool data structure bridging, downstream parsing, and Schema consistency testing

Notes:

  • QD-PS-1.6 and QD-ST-3.5 are same-root (output constraint/structure consistency); the deduplication primary is QD-ST-3.5.
  • QD-TT-5.1 / QD-TT-5.2 carry over from the Tool subset's QD-T-3.5 (Cross-Tool Data Flow) / QD-T-4.3 (Multi-Tool Semantic Competition); the original namespace no longer maps them repeatedly.

A.5 Permission Defect Mapping ​

QD-PM-* are produced by the Inspect Permission Governance subset (permission v1.1). This table only defines mapping directions, and does not automatically determine permission defects as EX risks or actual events; EX classification is still independently determined by Risk Explicit. The Permission subset executes after other subsets and is subject to Gate-0 preconditions; when Gate-0 is not met, no QD-PM defects are produced, and this table does not apply.

QD RuleNameApplicabilityPrimary Attack SurfacePotential ImpactMapping StrengthRecommended Validation
QD-PM-1.1~1.7Permission Alignment (responsibility proportionality; 1.7 is fixed P2)AC-L1~L4 (1.6 aggregated capability is a conditional item, requiring a multi-permission combination form)AS-04D2, D3, AvailabilityStrongOut-of-role resource access, aggregated unauthorized access, and task failure or workaround due to insufficient permissions testing
QD-PM-2.1~2.8Permission Scope (resource/data/environment/condition four axes)AC-L1~L4 (2.5/2.6/2.7 are conditional items requiring the corresponding forms)AS-04, AS-03D1, D2, D3StrongOut-of-scope resource access, cross-tenant data reading, test/production environment confusion, and out-of-condition triggering testing
QD-PM-3.1~3.6Permission Granularity (including 3.3 role substitution and 3.4 high-risk not separated, fixed P0)AC-L1~L4 (3.4/3.5/3.6 are conditional items)AS-04, AS-05D2, D3StrongA single role completing "initiation + approval", high-risk and routine operations executed with the same authority, and role impersonation testing
QD-PM-4.1~4.8Permission Propagation (including 4.2 downstream exceeds upstream, 4.4 delegation escalation, 4.8 external permissions; also the INHERITED overlap marker)AC-L1~L4 (4.3/4.4/4.5/4.6 delegation chain items are AC-L4 only; 4.7 is AC-L2+; 4.8 is a conditional item)AS-04, AS-07, AS-08D1, D2, D3StrongCall chain permission inheritance, downstream vs upstream, delegation chain escalation, and external permission source testing
QD-PM-5.1~5.7Permission Boundary (including 5.4 isolation substituting for fixed P0, 5.7 exemption uncontrolled)AC-L1~L4 (5.4 applies unconditionally; 5.5/5.7 are conditional items requiring the corresponding forms)AS-04, AS-05D2, D3StrongExemption trigger conditions, exemption expiration, and bypass after isolation substitutes for permission constraints testing
QD-PM-6.1~6.7Permission Auditability (including 6.3 no human confirmation fixed P0, 6.5 inventory not enumerable fixed P0, 6.7 fixed P1)AC-L1~L4 (6.6 requires AC-L2+; 6.1/6.2/6.3/6.4/6.7 are conditional items requiring OR-L2+/L3 or regulated data)AS-05, AS-09D2, D3, AuditabilityMedium (the group contains 6.3/6.5 fixed P0; group-level strength does not represent grading)High-risk operation direct reach without confirmation, permission inventory not enumerable / not reviewable, and audit log missing testing

Note: QD-PM totals 43 items and is mapped here in 6 groups. The attack surfaces and impact types of group members use the group-level mapping as a common direction, but the recommended validation column of each group already lists the differentiated directions within the group; the group-level "mapping strength" indicates how strongly the group as a whole should be prioritized for validation and does not represent the severity level of member rules (see §1.3).


Appendix B: Tool-Agent Failure Mode and Supplementary Test Mapping ​

Family wildcard convention: Family wildcard notations in Appendices B/C/D such as QD-P-1.x, QD-P-2.3.x, QD-T-2.x, QD-T-4.x, and QD-S-4.x refer only to the currently effective members of that family, excluding numbers that have been deleted (QD-P-2.1.1, QD-P-1.4.2, QD-P-2.3.3), deprecated (QD-P-2.5.5), merged (QD-T-4.2), or transferred (QD-T-3.5→QD-TT-5.1, QD-T-4.3→QD-TT-5.2). The complete list of effective members is defined by Appendix A.

B.1 QD Category to Failure Mode Mapping ​

QD CategoryCandidate Failure ModesRecommended Supplementary Tests
Prompt logic contradiction, mismatch, implication defectsFM-01, FM-02, FM-07, FM-09Conflicting rules, out-of-role tasks, goal and constraint conflicts
Prompt input definition defectsFM-01, FM-04Empty input, missing fields, format errors, conflicting fields
Prompt output definition defectsFM-06Downstream parsing, Schema, required fields, stability
Prompt workflow and resource defectsFM-03, FM-04, FM-05Tool selection, parameter construction, call order, dependency passing
Prompt boundary, frequency, and termination defectsFM-08, FM-09, FM-10Maximum call count, confirmation, rate limiting, timeout, budget
Prompt exception handling defectsFM-08, FM-10Timeout, 429, permission denial, partial success, and idempotency
Prompt example design defectsFM-01, FM-07, FM-09Positive/negative examples, boundary examples, dangerous requests, multi-turn regression
Skill resource or unbounded declaration defectsFM-08, FM-10Large input, large batch, loop, budget, and timeout
Skill trigger, ambiguity, scope defectsFM-02, FM-07, FM-09Adjacent intent, negative intent, mixed intent, insufficient information
Skill failure expansion defectsFM-08, FM-09Tool failure, permission denial, insufficient data, partial completion
Skill permission and environment boundary defectsFM-05, FM-09Read/write/delete, production environment, chained calls, and confirmation
Tool structure and parameter defectsFM-03, FM-04, FM-05Schema, type, format, boundary values, extra fields
Tool high-risk operation defectsFM-08, FM-09, FM-10Write operations, batch, rollback, data flow, idempotency
Tool semantic competition defectsFM-03, FM-05Similar Tools, near-synonym requests, ambiguous tasks
Tool Schema change defectsFM-04, FM-05, FM-06Historical call replay, old/new version compatibility
Cross contract defectsFM-04, FM-05, FM-06, FM-08Prompt→Skill→Tool end-to-end call chain testing
Inter-Skill trigger conflict and name similarity (QD-SS)FM-02, FM-03, FM-07Overlapping triggers, adjacent/negative intent, and misselection by identical or similar names testing
Cross-Tool data structure incompatibility (QD-TT-5.3)FM-05, FM-06Type incompatibility, missing serialization/conversion step, and downstream parsing failure testing
Skill-to-Skill handoff loop (QD-CYC-1.3)FM-08, FM-10Handoff termination conditions, maximum rounds, and downstream allowlist closed-loop testing
Permission proportionality defects (QD-PM)FM-05, FM-09, FM-10Out-of-role unauthorized invocation, high-risk operations without confirmation, and task failure or workaround due to insufficient permissions testing

B.2 Failure Fact Reverse Diagnostic Quick Reference ​

Observed FailurePriority Investigation Direction
Wrong Skill or Tool selectedQD-S-3.1, QD-S-3.6, QD-T-4.1, QD-TT-5.2, QD-SS-4.1, QD-SS-4.2, QD-P-2.4.3
Parameter missing, incorrect, or malformed formatQD-P-2.2.x, QD-T-1.2, QD-T-2.x, QD-PT-2.3, QD-PT-2.7, QD-ST-3.3
Call order, dependency, or state passing errorsQD-P-2.4.1/2.4.3, QD-PS-1.7, QD-PT-2.2, QD-ST-3.1–3.3
Downstream cannot consume outputQD-P-2.3.x, QD-PS-1.6, QD-ST-3.5, QD-TT-5.3
Repeated calls or direct interruption after exceptionQD-P-2.6.x, QD-S-4.x, QD-PT-2.5, QD-ST-3.7
High-risk action missing confirmationQD-P-2.5.3, QD-S-5.2, QD-T-3.1, QD-PT-2.4, QD-ST-3.6
Inconsistent results for same inputQD-P-1.1.x, QD-P-1.6.x, QD-P-2.3.1/2.3.2, QD-S-3.5
Call loops, abnormal cost, or timeoutQD-P-2.5.1, QD-P-2.6.3, QD-S-1.3, QD-S-2.2, QD-CYC-1.3, QD-ST-3.4

Appendix C: RAG-Agent Metrics and Supplementary Test Mapping ​

C.1 QD Category to RAG Quality Metrics Mapping ​

QD CategoryPotentially Affected MetricsRecommended Supplementary Tests
Prompt logic contradiction, mismatch, implication defectsCorrectness, Relevance, Consistency, Format ComplianceRule conflicts, role boundaries, multi-constraint Q&A
Prompt gray zone defectsConsistency, Robustness, Boundary Recognition, Safety ResponseVague terms, multi-turn follow-ups, conflicting rules, knowledge updates
Prompt input definition defectsRelevance, Robustness, Decomposition Capability, Boundary RecognitionColloquial rewrites, missing conditions, multi-intent, abnormal formats
Prompt output definition defectsCompleteness, Traceability, Format Compliance, ConsistencyCitations, structure, disclaimers, JSON/Markdown
Prompt workflow, resource, and Tool defectsCorrectness, Traceability, TimelinessKnowledge source selection, retrieval Tool, citation chain, and failure fallback
Prompt security, permission, and exception boundary defectsBoundary Recognition, Safety Response, CoherenceUnauthorized, sensitive, no-hit, handoff-required, and dependency failure
Prompt example design defectsCorrectness, Robustness, Consistency, Format CompliancePositive/negative examples, boundary expressions, adversarial rewrites
Skill resource and unbounded declaration defectsCompleteness, Timeliness, RobustnessLarge input, multi-documents, exceeding limits, partial completion
Skill trigger, scope, and ambiguity defectsRelevance, Decomposition Capability, Boundary RecognitionIntent boundaries, non-activation, clarification and handoff
Skill failure expansion defectsCompleteness, Coherence, Safety ResponseNo hits, low-confidence sources, source conflicts, retrieval failure
Skill permission and environment boundary defectsBoundary Recognition, Safety Response, TraceabilitySensitive data, user identity, production data, external resources
Tool parameter and semantic defectsCorrectness, Relevance, Traceability, Format ComplianceRetrieval parameters, source return, citation parsing, similar Tools
Cross contract defectsCorrectness, Completeness, Consistency, Traceability, Safety ResponseEnd-to-end retrieval, citation, error handling, permission, and output contracts
Inter-Skill trigger conflict and name similarity (QD-SS)Relevance, Correctness, Boundary RecognitionOverlapping triggers, misselection by similar names, and direct answering where clarification is due
Cross-Tool data structure incompatibility (QD-TT-5.3)Correctness, Traceability, Format ComplianceRetrieval result field type mismatch, missing serialization, and citation parsing failure
Skill-to-Skill handoff loop (QD-CYC-1.3)Timeliness, CoherenceHandoff without termination, repeated routing, and response timeout
Permission proportionality defects (QD-PM)Boundary Recognition, Safety Response, TraceabilityUnauthorized retrieval, cross-tenant data access, and direct answering where refusal is due

C.2 RAG Failure Reverse Diagnostic Quick Reference ​

Quality Failure FactPriority Inspect Investigation DirectionNon-Inspect Causes to Exclude Simultaneously
Critical fact errorQD-P-1.x, QD-P-2.4.x, QD-T-4.x, QD-ST-3.5Outdated knowledge, retrieval recall, re-ranking, model hallucination
Missing exceptions, limitations, or stepsQD-P-2.3.x, QD-S-3.4, QD-S-4.2Incomplete baseline answers, context truncation, knowledge gaps
Off-topic response or missing multiple requestsQD-P-1.2.x, QD-S-3.1/3.4, QD-T-4.xIntent recognition implementation, context construction, model capability
No citation or citation does not support conclusionQD-P-2.3.x, QD-P-2.4.x, QD-ST-3.5Retrieval metadata, citation chain implementation, knowledge base structure
Using outdated rulesQD-P-1.6.7, QD-S-1.5, QD-T-5.xKnowledge snapshot, document lifecycle, index updates
Should have refused, clarified, or handed off but answered directlyQD-P-2.5.2/2.5.3, QD-S-3.2, QD-S-5.x, QD-PS-1.3, QD-PM-5.xIAM, runtime Guardrail, identity context
Safety response correct but missing explanation, path, or alternativeQD-P-2.3.x, QD-P-2.7.x, QD-S-4.xBusiness rules, response templates, evaluation criteria
Multi-turn self-contradictionQD-P-1.1.x, QD-P-1.6.x, QD-P-2.5.4, QD-S-3.5Session memory, context window, model or configuration changes

Appendix D: Typical Linked Defect Chains ​

Defect chains represent candidate risk paths or failure modes formed by multiple interrelated static defects weakening defense depth or causing task failures. Defect chains do not represent that attacks, data leakage, or quality failures have occurred; they still require confirmation by Risk or Quality results.

D.1 Security Defect Chains ​

IDDefect ChainCandidate Risk ResultRecommended Validation
SC-01QD-P-2.5.2 Missing Security Boundary Constraints + QD-S-3.2 Missing Deactivation Conditions + QD-T-3.2 Untrusted Input Entering an Executable ContextIndirect Prompt Injection inducing unauthorized Tool callsUntrusted document/web content injection, encoding variants, end-to-end Tool call testing
SC-02QD-P-2.5.3 Missing Permission Control Boundaries + QD-S-5.1 Read/Write/Delete Permissions Not Distinguished + QD-T-3.1 State Change and Material Side Effect DeclarationUsers inducing write, delete, or change with low-risk requestsRead request to write/delete operations, implicit confirmation, rollback, and audit testing
SC-03QD-S-5.2 Missing High-Risk Operation Confirmation Mechanism + QD-T-3.3 Batch/Range Write Operation Without Cap + QD-T-3.1 State Change and Material Side Effect DeclarationBatch deletion, batch exfiltration, or batch updatesMaximum batch, duplicate submission, interruption recovery, confirmation bypass testing
SC-04QD-S-1.5 Data Source Boundary Missing + QD-TT-5.1 Cross-Tool Data Flow + QD-P-2.3.4 Missing Security/Privacy FilteringCross-source aggregation of sensitive data to external Tool exfiltrationTainted data flow, cross-tenant, external recipients, and anonymization testing
SC-05QD-S-5.3 Undeclared Environment Boundaries + QD-S-5.4 Undeclared Chained Invocation Permissions + QD-ST-3.6 Permission Scope Matching DefectTest or low-privilege Skill indirectly operating production resourcesEnvironment isolation, call chain permission inheritance, production operation simulation testing
SC-06QD-P-2.5.1 Missing Termination Constraints + QD-S-1.3 Execution Resource Boundary Missing + QD-S-2.2 Unterminated Execution DeclarationInfinite loop, call storm, cost or resource exhaustionMaximum rounds, timeout, 429, budget exhaustion, and loop termination testing
SC-07QD-P-2.6.3 Unreasonable Retry Mechanism + QD-S-4.1 Undefined Failure Behavior + QD-T-3.1 State Change and Material Side Effect DeclarationFailure retry leading to duplicate payment, creation, or exfiltrationIdempotency, network interruption, partial success, duplicate request testing
SC-08QD-P-1.1.3 Example-Rule Contradiction + QD-P-2.5.4 Undefined Constraint Priority + QD-TT-5.2 Multi-Tool Semantic CompetitionExamples inducing model to bypass rules and select the wrong ToolExample-driven, multi-rule conflict, similar Tool selection testing
SC-09QD-T-1.4 Inappropriate additionalProperties Policy + QD-T-3.4 Authorization Context Parameter Exposure + QD-PT-2.4 Permission Granularity Consistency DefectForging tenant, role, or internal control fields to achieve privilege escalationAdditional fields, reserved fields, tenant ID, admin flag tampering testing
SC-10QD-P-2.2.1 Undeclared Input Source + QD-S-3.4 Undefined Task Scope + QD-TT-5.1 Cross-Tool Data FlowUntrusted content changing task goals and guiding data exfiltrationIndirect injection, goal hijacking, and data exfiltration Tool chain testing
SC-11QD-PM-4.2 Downstream Exceeds Upstream + QD-S-5.4 Undeclared Chained Invocation Permissions + QD-ST-3.6 Permission Scope Matching DefectLow-permission entry Skill indirectly obtains downstream high-permission Tool effective authority through call chain (ASI03 direction: un-scoped privilege inheritance)Per-hop effective permission comparison in call chain, downstream Tool executing with upstream identity, INHERITED permission reclamation testing
SC-12QD-PM-4.4 Delegation Escalation + QD-S-3.4 Undefined Task Scope + QD-P-2.5.2 Missing Security Boundary ConstraintsGoal hijacking obtains permissions beyond the initiator through delegation/sub-Agent and expands laterally (ASI01 → ASI03 direction)Indirect injection triggering delegation, delegation chain permission upper bound, sub-task permission vs parent task comparison testing
SC-13QD-PM-3.4 High-Risk Not Separated + QD-PM-6.3 No Human Confirmation + QD-T-3.1 State Change and Material Side Effect DeclarationHigh-risk write/delete/exfiltration operations executed directly by the same permission principal without confirmation (ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation direction)High-risk operation path without direct confirmation, same role for initiation and approval, irreversible operation simulation testing
SC-14QD-SS-4.1 Trigger Condition Conflict + QD-SS-4.2 Name Uniqueness / Near-Duplicate Misleading + QD-S-5.2 Missing High-Risk Operation Confirmation MechanismA user request is routed to a high-risk Skill with a similar name or overlapping trigger, and the confirmation step is missingEnd-to-end testing of overlapping triggers, similar names, and direct reach of high-risk operations where clarification is due
SC-15QD-TT-5.3 Cross-Tool Data Structure Bridging + QD-ST-3.5 Output Structure Match + QD-T-1.3 enum–type ConflictUpstream Tool output and downstream Tool input types are incompatible, causing silent truncation, field loss, or erroneous conversionEnd-to-end type contract, serialization/conversion steps, abnormal returns, and data integrity testing

Relationship with existing SC-02, SC-05, SC-09: SC-11 is a permission-side deepening of SC-05 (SC-05 focuses on environment boundaries, SC-11 focuses on effective permission amplification along the call chain); do not merge, retain independent numbering.

D.2 Tool-Agent Quality Defect Chains ​

IDDefect ChainCandidate Quality FailureRecommended Supplementary Tests
QC-TA-01QD-S-3.1 Vague Trigger Conditions + QD-T-4.1 Insufficient description Quality + QD-TT-5.2 Multi-Tool Semantic Competition + QD-SS-4.1/4.2 Trigger Conflict and Name SimilaritySkill or Tool misselection, task failureAdjacent intents, near-synonym tasks, negative intents, mixed intents, similar names
QC-TA-02QD-P-2.2.x Input Definition Defects + QD-T-1.2 required Inconsistency + QD-T-2.x Parameter Constraint InsufficientParameter missing, type error, or Schema validation failureEmpty input, missing fields, format variants, boundary values
QC-TA-03QD-P-2.4.3 Incorrect Tool Invocation Parameters or Order + QD-PT-2.2 Invocation Specification Consistency Defect + QD-ST-3.2 Input Constraint Consistency DefectCall order errors or missing dependency dataMulti-Tool order dependencies, failure rollback, and state passing
QC-TA-04QD-P-2.3.1 Undefined Output Format + QD-PS-1.6 Output Constraint Consistency Defect + QD-ST-3.5 Output Structure Matching Defect + QD-TT-5.3 Cross-Tool Data Structure BridgingResults not consumable by downstream systemsStructured output, parsing validation and field completeness, cross-Tool type conversion
QC-TA-05QD-P-2.6.x Exception Handling Defects + QD-S-4.x Failure Expansion Defects + QD-ST-3.7 Error Handling Coverage DefectInfinite retry after exception, incorrect fallback calls, or task interruptionTimeout, 429, permission denial, and external dependency failure
QC-TA-06QD-S-2.1 Unlimited Quantity + QD-T-2.4 Array No Length Constraint + QD-T-3.3 Batch Operation UnrestrictedLarge batch tasks timing out, partially executing, or failingMaximum batch, pagination, cancellation, and checkpoint recovery
QC-TA-07QD-P-1.1.x Logic Conflict + QD-P-2.5.4 Constraint Priority Not Defined + QD-S-3.5 Default Behavior Not DeclaredUnstable execution path for same inputRepeated runs, multi-constraint conflicts, and missing information testing

D.3 RAG-Agent Quality Defect Chains ​

IDDefect ChainCandidate Quality FailureRecommended Supplementary Tests
QC-RA-01QD-P-2.3.x Output Definition Defects + QD-P-2.7.x Example Design DefectsIncomplete answers, non-compliant formats, or missing citationsRequired points, citation formats, positive/negative examples, boundary cases
QC-RA-02QD-P-2.2.1 Input Source Not Declared + QD-S-1.5 Data Source Boundary MissingUnable to distinguish trusted knowledge, user statements, and external contentFact conflicts, malicious documents, historical session pollution
QC-RA-03QD-S-3.2 Non-Activation Condition Missing + QD-S-3.4 Task Scope Not Defined + QD-P-2.5.2 Security Boundary Constraint MissingAnswering beyond knowledge and authorization scope without clarification or refusalUnauthorized questions, no knowledge hits, sensitive questions, handoff-required questions
QC-RA-04QD-P-2.4.2 Resource Not Declared + QD-T-4.1 Insufficient Description Quality + QD-PT-2.2 Call Specification Consistency DefectIncorrect use of retrieval, citation, or knowledge Tool, leading to wrong answersMulti-knowledge source selection, retrieval failure, and citation chain testing
QC-RA-05QD-S-4.1 Failure Behavior Not Defined + QD-S-4.2 Partial Completion Not DeclaredFabrication when retrieval is insufficient, or answer interruption without explanationNo hits, low confidence, partial information, and source conflicts
QC-RA-06QD-P-1.1.1 Direct Contradiction + QD-P-1.6.1 Ambiguous Key Decision Terms + QD-P-2.5.4 Constraint Priority Not DefinedMulti-turn self-contradiction or unstable safety responsesAmbiguous boundaries, multi-turn follow-ups, rule conflicts, and adversarial expressions

Appendix E: Mapping Record YAML / JSON Examples ​

E.1 Single Defect Mapping Record (YAML) ​

yaml
mapping_id: MAP-QD-T-3.2-v1
mapping_version: v1.0   # mapping record template version, independent of this document's specification version
status: active

source:
  defect_id: QD-T-3.2
  defect_name: Untrusted Input Entering an Executable Context
  artifact_type: Tool
  source_standard: Inspect Tool
  source_standard_version: v1.1

applicability:
  or_levels: [OR-L2, OR-L3]
  required_conditions:
    - User input, external documents, or other untrusted context can influence this parameter
    - Parameter will be interpreted, executed, or further forwarded by the backend
  exclusions:
    - Backend has implemented verifiable strict type validation, allowlist, and safe encoding handling

security_associations:
  - attack_surface_id: AS-02
    attack_surface_name: Input and Parameter Injection
    potential_impacts: [D1, D2, D3]
    mapping_strength: strong   # values correspond to §1.3: strong / medium / conditional / not_applicable
    validation_recommendations:
      risk_explicit:
        - Check for explicit dangerous parameter descriptions, dangerous examples, or bypass expressions
      risk_implicit:
        - Parameter injection
        - Encoding and escape bypass
        - Boundary parameters
        - Downstream passthrough chains
    success_evidence:
      - Unauthorized parameters accepted by backend
      - Parameters trigger unexpected queries, writes, exfiltration, or privilege behaviors

quality_associations:
  tool_agent:
    candidate_failure_modes: [FM-04, FM-05, FM-08]
    mapping_strength: strong
    regression_tests:
      - Missing parameters
      - Illegal formats
      - Oversized input
      - Boundary values
      - Downstream error returns
  rag_agent:
    candidate_metrics:
      - Boundary recognition capability
      - Safety response capability
      - Traceability
    mapping_strength: conditional
    conditions:
      - Tool used for retrieval, citation, external knowledge access, or content exfiltration

evidence_requirements:
  static:
    - Tool Schema fragment
    - Parameter description
    - Version hash
  dynamic:
    - Call parameter traces
    - Tool return records
    - Shadow sandbox test results
  quality:
    - Baseline test case version
    - Agent output
    - Scores or judgment results

limitations:
  - Static defect does not prove backend lacks protection.
  - Attack exploitability must be confirmed by Risk Implicit.
  - Quality impact must be confirmed by Quality baseline test cases.

ownership:
  primary_owner: Tool Owner
  supporting_owners: [Security Owner, Agent Owner]

regression_requirements:
  - Re-run Inspect Tool after remediation
  - Re-run associated Risk Implicit test cases
  - Re-run associated Tool-Agent Quality test cases

E.2 Defect Chain Record (YAML) ​

yaml
chain_id: SC-04
chain_name: Cross-Tool Sensitive Data Exfiltration Candidate Chain
chain_type: security
status: open

members:
  - defect_id: QD-S-1.5
    role: Data source boundary missing
  - defect_id: QD-TT-5.1
    role: Cross-Tool data flow risk
  - defect_id: QD-P-2.3.4
    role: Security and privacy filter missing

chain_hypothesis:
  statement: >
    When Skill does not restrict readable data sources, Tool can forward data to
    external destinations, and Prompt does not define sensitive information filtering,
    an unauthorized data exfiltration path may form.

potential_impacts: [confidentiality, authorization]
mapping_strength: strong

validation_plan:
  environment: shadow
  test_data:
    - Synthetic sensitive data
    - Cross-tenant marked data
    - External recipients and controlled exfiltration endpoints
  tests:
    - Untrusted content induces reading sensitive fields
    - Read results forwarded to external Tool
    - Anonymization, permission, and confirmation bypass attempts
  success_criteria:
    - Sensitive fields enter unauthorized Tool calls
    - Exfiltration destination can be controlled by user input or untrusted content

required_regression:
  - Data source allowlist verification
  - Cross-Tool taint propagation verification
  - Sensitive field anonymization verification
  - Pre-exfiltration permission and confirmation verification

E.3 API Return Example (JSON) ​

json
{
  "finding_id": "F-20260719-00128",
  "defect": {
    "rule_id": "QD-S-5.2",
    "name": "Missing High-Risk Operation Confirmation Mechanism",
    "severity": "Inspect·P0",
    "artifact": "skill:customer-refund",
    "agent_level": "AC-L3"
  },
  "impact_mapping": {
    "status": "mapped",
    "security": [
      {
        "attack_surface": "AS-05",
        "potential_impacts": ["D2", "D3"],
        "strength": "strong",
        "statement": "May lead to high-risk operations such as refunds, deletions, or exfiltration executed without confirmation."
      }
    ],
    "quality": {
      "tool_agent": {
        "candidate_failure_modes": ["FM-09"],
        "recommended_tests": [
          "Vague confirmation statements",
          "Negative confirmation statements",
          "Repeated confirmation",
          "Cancellation confirmation"
        ]
      },
      "rag_agent": {
        "candidate_metrics": ["Boundary recognition capability", "Safety response capability"],
        "strength": "conditional"
      }
    }
  },
  "validation": {
    "explicit_recommended": true,
    "implicit_recommended": true,
    "status": "not_started"
  },
  "regression": {
    "inspect": "required",
    "risk": "required",
    "quality": "required"
  }
}

Appendix F: Terminology and External Standard Mapping ​

F.1 SanityOps Internal Terminology Cross-Reference ​

This Specification TermInspectRisk ExplicitRisk ImplicitQuality
Static DefectQD defectsN/AN/AN/A
Explicit RiskMay serve as defect evidenceNL, NR risksMay serve as attack prerequisiteMay serve as scenario risk label
Attack SurfaceDefect association outputRisk interpretation dimensionAttack strategy selection inputHigh-risk test case selection input
ExploitabilityNot determinedNot determinedDynamic attack resultNot determined
Quality FailureCandidate impactNot determinedAttack side-effect observationBaseline test case actual result
Release ConclusionInspect Gate inputExplicit Gate inputImplicit Gate inputQuality Gate input
Root CauseCandidate static root causeExplicit risk sourceAttack path conditionsCandidate quality root cause

F.2 Relationship with CIA / Authorization Model ​

SanityOps Security ConsequenceCode in This SpecificationCommon Security Model CorrespondenceDescription
ConfidentialityD1CIA: ConfidentialityUnauthorized reading, leakage, prompts, or sensitive data exfiltration
IntegrityD2CIA: IntegrityUnauthorized writing, deletion, payment, configuration, or business data modification
Authorization RiskD3Authorization / Access ControlPrivilege escalation, identity confusion, cross-tenant, erroneous delegation
Availability—CIA: AvailabilityLoops, resource exhaustion, uncontrolled batch operations, service degradation
Audit and Traceability—Accountability / Non-repudiationUnable to associate sources, parameters, evidence, call chains, or responsible parties

Availability and auditability are extended impact dimensions of this specification and do not occupy D numbers; D1/D2/D3 are impact type labels defined by Risk Explicit, and this specification only references their classification without participating in grading.

F.3 Relationship with OWASP LLM / Agentic Risks ​

This specification can reference OWASP risk language, but does not use OWASP numbering to replace SanityOps QD numbering, nor claims one-to-one correspondence.

SanityOps Attack SurfaceReference OWASP Risk DirectionsTypical SanityOps Defects
AS-01Prompt Injection, System Prompt LeakageQD-P-2.5.2, QD-P-2.5.6, QD-P-2.2.1, QD-S-3.4
AS-02Improper Input Handling, InjectionQD-T-1.4, QD-T-2.x, QD-T-3.2, QD-T-3.7, QD-P-2.2.2
AS-03Sensitive Information Disclosure, Improper Output HandlingQD-P-2.3.4, QD-TT-5.1, QD-PM-2.x
AS-04Excessive Agency, Excessive PermissionsQD-P-2.5.3, QD-S-5.x, QD-ST-3.6, QD-T-3.7, QD-PM-1.x, QD-PM-2.x, QD-PM-3.x, QD-PM-4.x, QD-PM-5.x
AS-05Tool Misuse, Unsafe Action ExecutionQD-T-3.1, QD-T-3.7, QD-TT-5.2, QD-SS-4.1, QD-PM-3.4, QD-PM-5.x, QD-PM-6.3
AS-06Unbounded Consumption, Denial of ServiceQD-P-2.5.1, QD-S-2.x, QD-T-3.3, QD-CYC-1.1, QD-CYC-1.2, QD-CYC-1.3
AS-07Insecure Error Handling, Failure EscalationQD-P-2.6.x, QD-S-4.x, QD-ST-3.7, QD-PM-4.x
AS-08Supply Chain, Tool / Plugin RiskQD-TT-5.2, QD-TT-5.3, QD-SS-4.2, QD-T-5.x, QD-PM-4.8
AS-09Agentic System MisconfigurationQD-PS-1.x, QD-PT-2.x, QD-ST-3.x, QD-SS-4.x, QD-TT-5.x, QD-CYC-1.x, QD-PM-6.x

On the relationship between ASI03 and QD-PM: OWASP 2026 treats ASI03 as the evolution of LLM06 Excessive Agency in agentic scenarios, one of its typical forms being "un-scoped privilege inheritance." This highly overlaps with QD-PM-4.x (permission propagation, downstream exceeds upstream, delegation escalation, INHERITED) in problem space, but the granularity differs: ASI03 is a risk result category, while QD-PM-4.x are statically locatable artifact defects. Relevance only states that "QD-PM-4.x is a common starting point toward ASI03," and does not claim that detecting QD-PM-4.x constitutes an ASI03 risk.

Usage Limitations ​

  1. Not a one-to-one correspondence: A single SanityOps attack surface may map to multiple OWASP items, and a single OWASP item may span multiple SanityOps attack surfaces. The table above shows reference directions only.
  2. Not alternative compliance: Referencing OWASP risk language does not substitute for any formal compliance or certification process.
  3. Not for external declarations: The terms and mappings in this specification are used for internal communication and threat modeling and shall not be used in customer-facing compliance or audit reports without explicit review.
  4. Independent evidence standards: Compliance audits, penetration testing, and runtime monitoring must still adopt their respective independent evidence standards.

Version History ​

VersionRelease DateKey Changes
v1.02026-10Initial release
v1.12026-10Expanded Inspect and Permission defect coverage; Risk Explicit regraded to P0/P1/P2; multi-hit design principle clarified; terminology aligned to Logic Artifacts

The SanityOps Inspect Defect Impact and Linkage Mapping Specification v1.1 main text and appendices are now complete.


© 2026 Sanity AI Labs. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International. https://www.sanityops.org · hello@sanityops.org v1.1 · October 2026